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Scandinavian Architecture During
the Late 1930s:
Asplund and Aalto vs. Functionalism
William C. Miller
Kansas State University
Though we claim to be living in a post-
industrial society and to be engaged in devel-
oping a "postmodern" architecture, much of
our architectural practice is still grounded in
techniques derived from modem architec-
ture's emphasis on industrial production.
We criticize the ubiquitous placelessness and
the abstract nature of space resulting from
modernist acceptance of universal tech-
nique, only to justify, it would seem, replac-
ing it with an equally placeless and abstract
historicism. It is a historicism bearing wit-
ness to the loss ofour own sense of history at
two levels: First, we lack awareness of our
own local histories and traditions; and sec-
ond, we are unaware of the vital heritages
provided by our collective, immediate past.
For instance, only recently have we begun to
demonstrate a real understanding of, and
appreciation for, the diversity of directions
that occurred in architecture between the
first and second World Wars. Moreover,
mired in the present, we seem to forget that a
number of architects have been, for five dec-
ades now, critically scrutinizing modernist
tenets. In the decade and a half before World
War II, many designers not only used local
tradition to transform the universalizing ten-
dencies of modernism, but did so without
being sentimental or nostalgic. By using
regional heritages to critique modernism's
generalizing techniques, they revitalized the
experiential and mnemonic capacities of
architecture.
Scandinavian architectural practice during
the 1930s provides a case in point. Although
Nordic architects embraced "Functional-
ism"—as modernism was termed in Scandi-
navia—by the early thirties, almost immedi-
ately a number of individuals began ques-
tioning Functionalism's basic precepts. For
those critical of modernism, architectural
production assumed one of two modes. The
first and more widely practiced of the two
sought to modify Functionalism's focus on
universal technique by using regional norms
ofexpression and craft. The second, exempli-
fied by the work ofGunnarAsplund and Alvar
Aalto, resulted in a practice that subverted
modernist sensibilities by reasserting the
primacy of place, both physically and cultur-
ally, and employing the full gamut of sensory
and tactile experiences that architecture can
convey to the individual.
Nordic Functionalism
Scandinavian awareness of the new ideas
emerging from continental Europe began In
the 1920s, as Nordic architectural journals
began publishing the work of the French.
German, Dutch, and Russian avant-garde.
At this time, northern architects were espe-
cially open to currents from the outside and
willing to participate in theoretical and po-
lemical discussion. Le Corbusier and Walter
Gropius lectured in the north, and five
Scandinavian architects attended the 1929
C.I.A.M. meeting in Frankfort on the mini-
mum dwelling. Moreover, Nordic architects,
including Gunnar Asplund and Alvar Aalto,
traveled throughout Europe to visit the semi-
nal works of the new architecture. Asplund's
and Aalto's first-hand knowledge of avant-
garde developments was not only instrumen-
tal in the promulgation of Nordic Functional-
ism but established them among its leaders.
While Asplund's Stockholm Exhibition of
1930 and Aalto's Turun Sanomat Newspaper
Building {1929) and Paimio Sanatorium
(1929-33) (fig. 1) are seminal pieces of Nordic
Functionalism, by the early thirties a number
of especially fine examples of modernism
existed throughout Scandinavia. Exemplary
works—embracing both modernism's formal
canons and its social programs—were also
produced by Erik Bryggman, Viljo Revell,
Oiva Kallio, and P. E. Blomstedt (fig. 2) in
Finland; Ame Jacobsen, Flemming Lassen,
Mogens Lassen, and Edvard Heiberg in
Denmark: Lars Backer, Frithjof Reppen, Ove
Bang, and Ame Korsmo in Norway: and Uno
Ahren, Sven Markelius, Eskil Sundahl, and
Hakon Ahlberg in Sweden. For these archi-
tects, Functionalism was a symbol of moder-
nity, internationalism, and progressiveness
that broke radically with the perceived pro-
vincialism of Scandinavia's recent past.
Nordic Functionalism was, like continental
modernism, an oppositional architecture
critical of bourgeois attitudes and values and
the normaling functions of tradition.
Accepting both the formal canons and social
programs ofmodernism, Functionalist archi-
tecture was characterized by the use of the
"free" plan: the separation of structure from
building envelope, with the structure (usu-
ally of concrete) being detached from the
"free" facade: and a machine imagery created
by taut-skinned, white cubic volumes with
minimalist detailing. Many Nordic architects
had directly experienced the major new
works on the continent, which led to ex-
tremely sophisticated buildings—both for-
mally and in detail qualities—being executed
in Scandinavia during this period. In fact,
Aalto's knowledge of his peers' work and his
quick assimilation ofmodernism's industrial
detailing techniques was wryly commented
upon by Hilding Ekelund in 1930: "With the
same ardent enthusiasm as the academics of
the 1880s drew Roman baroque portals,
Gothic pinnacles, etc. in their sketchbooks
for use in their architectural practice, Alvar
Aalto noses out new, rational-technical de-'
tails from all over Europe which he then
makes use of and transforms with consider-
able skill."' Nordic Functionalists further
accepted the bias for buildings sited in open,
park-like settings. In built works as well as in
proposals, sections of extant urban fabric
were opened to auto access and the perceived
health-giving properties of sun. air, and
greenery.
Functionalism's proponents were active
propagandists who used the popular press to
promote the new architecture and its social
ideas in Scandinavia.^ To enlighten the
general public about the new housing con-
cepts tailored to "modem life," the housing
section ofthe Stockholm Exhibition as well as
a number of other exhibitions on the modem
dwelling were held in the Nordic countries at
this time.^ A year after the Stockholm Exhi-
bition, six Swedish architects, Asplund in-
Figure 1. Alvar Aallo. Tuberculosis Sanatorium. Paimio. Finland. 1929-33 (photo: author).
eluded, published the manifesto >\cceptera, a
polemic supporting Functionalist ideolo-
gies.'' As a result of this activist posture,
Nordic architects received a level of political
support unequaled on the continent; that is,
the physical propositions of Functionalist
social programs became the mandated plan-
ning principles of the Scandinavian welfare-
state governments during the 1940s.^
Regional Norms versus Universal
Technique
Though many architects continued to ac-
tively embrace Functionalism, criticism of its
propositions began to emerge during the mid-
1930s. This criticism initially concerned
tectonics and materiality. For as modernist
works appeared in Scandinavia and forces of
nature and the impact ofclimate began to act
upon them, architects questioned the advisa-
bility ofusing Mediterranean-inspired build-
ing forms in the harsh northern environ-
ment. The Danish architect Esbjom Hirt
observed that Functionalism's "unprotected
white surfaces and flat roofs were not suit-
able in our climate with its constant alterna-
tion between wet and dry and frost and
thaw."*^ To modify Functionalism's astrin-
gent forms and material palette, architects
incorporated traditional pitched-roof forms.
brick, tile, and stone cladding, and punched
window openings. This was a conscious
attempt, as Hirt noted, "to unite the modem
demand for rational, unsymmetrical, 'free'
planning with the desire for a building profile
retaining the traditional tile roofing that has
proved particularly suitable to the Danish
climate."^ Traditional norms softened Func-
tionalist "ethics," providing more corporeal
substance and regional character to the
work.
In achieving this, a common set of design
strategies was employed fairly consistently
throughout Scandinavia. First, green park-
like environs continued to be preferred as
building sites, so buildings maintained their
object status within an open landscape.
Simultaneously, architects strove to enhance
the "naturalistic" qualities of the extant set-
ting, a romantic tactic that would create a
picturesque relationship between the land-
scape and the seemingly casually placed
building forms. Second, designers integrated
modernist "free" planning and elemental
volumetrics with traditional building shapes
and roof profiles. Overhangs were excluded
from the pitched-roof forms in a desire to
maintain a taut, cubic outline. Buildings
appeared firmly rooted to the earth rather
than uplifted on pilotis. The resulting sim-
plicity of form, coupled with the asymmetri-
cal arrangement ofelements and picturesque
settings, imbued the buildings with a quiet
monumentality. Third, tectonics favored the
corporeality provided by local materials,
supplanting the abstract, ephemeral charac-
ter of surfaces rendered in stucco. Satisfying
this desire for increased tactility, brick, tile,
stone, and wood wall cladding replaced
stucco, while roofs were finished with tile,
shingles, and metal. Although concrete
frames were employed in large buildings,
many architects returned to traditional
masonry and wood construction systems for
more modest works. Finally, simply propor-
tioned, punched window openings replaced
the modem horizontal strip window. While
providing the image of a more traditional
window type, the scale of the aperture was
enlarged beyond the norms usually provided
by tradition.
Many representative works demonstrate
these tactics. In Denmark, there were Fisker,
Stegmann, and Moller's Arhus University
(1931-46), Fisker and Moller's Copenhagen
apartment block ( 1 939), F. Schlegel's Crema-
torium Chapel (1937), Jacobsen and Moller's
Arhus Town Hall (1939-42) (fig. 3), and Las-
sen and Moller's Nyborg Library (1939); in
Finland, E. Bryggman's Suomi Insurance
Headquarters (1938) and Resurrection
Chapel (1938-40) (fig. 4): and in Sweden, O.
Thunstrom's housing complex in Hojdhagen
(1938), E. Sundahl's summer villa (1939), H.
Egler's row housing in Stocksund ( 1 939) , and
S. Frolen's summer villa (1939).
As an attempt to transform modernism, this
sensibility resulted in only a modest modifi-
cation of Functionalist tenets. Instead of
critically scrutinizing the role regional norms
could play in impacting on modernist action,
architects were using a tactic that was merely
skin-deep accommodation. Modernism was
not reinvigorated; rather, traditional and
vernacular images were appropriated into
the equation. Modern rational planning
techniques had simply been mixed with lo-
cally acceptable building forms and material
usages. But for Asplund and Aalto, the thin
veil ofrespectability accorded by tradition did
not get to the root ofthe problem: for them the
critique of modernism was more instrumen-
tal.
During this same time, both Asplund and
Aalto were expressing concern about the
impact of mechanization on the human
spirit, as witnessed in Functionalism's reli-
ance upon universal technique. It was their
view that this design strategy yielded an
impoverished architecture that contributed
to the ever-increasing alienation experienced
by the individual in modem mass society.
Criticizing the limited compositional and
tectonic potentials of such an architecture,
Aalto stated in his 1935 lecture "Rationalism
and Man" : "We have conceded and we should
be agreed upon the fact that objects that
properly can be given the label rational often
suffer from a notable lack of human quali-
ties."*' By 1940, in the essay "The Humaniz-
ing of Architecture," he emphatically stated:
'Technical functionalism cannot create defi-
nite architecture."^ Asplund's 1936 speech,
"Art and Technology," contains similar senti-
ments: "One should not conceive of utility as
an end itself but merely as a means to in-
crease choice and well-being for people in this
life. Technology does not suffice to achieve
this "'«
Neither Aalto nor Asplund were suggesting
the rejection of industrial production per se;
rather they questioned its use as a composi-
tional or formal technique. They were pro-
posing a more humane architecture, one
going beyond the reductionist qualities of
Functionalism, that included a broader spec-
trum of practical techniques from which to
draw. Nor did they promote a nostalgic
traditionalism or historicism. Their aim was
to revitalize the capacity of architecture to
mediate between the universality of modem
civilization and specifics of local culture.
To attain this, they adopted a mode of prac-
tice that embraced the following attitudes
and sensibilities. The modem individual's
separation from nature was a primary con-
cern of both. This separation, coupled with
increased mechanization, created an es-
trangement between the individual and the
biological structures and rhythms of the
Figure 2. P. E. Blomstedt. Church. Kannonkoski.
Finland. 1938 (photo: author).
natural world. To foster a more direct partici-
pation with nature, both architects reas-
serted the importance of place—both physi-
cally and culturally—in their work. Rather
than merely enhancing a site, they actively
cultivated it, paying specific attention to the
particulars of the local condition. Modem
industrial techniques, especially technical
standardization and serial replication, often
produced experientially impoverished envi-
ronments. Asplund and Aalto, in appealing
to the full range of human experiences and
perceptions, employed a wide variety of sen-
sory and tactile qualities in their designs.
They eschewed the abstract, ephemeral tec-
tonics ofFunctionalism in favor ofa more cor-
poreal and tangible materiality rooted in the
norms of local tradition and usage. Their
agenda was to relink modem civilization with
an everyday praxis that included vital heri-
tages, to reintroduce memory and experience
to their appropriate places in architectural
design.
Asplund
Any of a half dozen works Gunnar Asplund
designed before his death in 1 940—including
the State Bacteriological Laboratory (1933-
37), his summer house Stennas (1937), the
crematoria at Kviberg (1936-40) and Skovde
(1937-40), and the Stockholm Social Welfare
Offices (1938)—demonstrate his critique of
Functionalism and its tenets. Two works will
suffice for discussion here, the Goteborg Law
Courts Addition ( 1 934-37) and the Woodland
Crematorium (1935-40); for through the very
differences of their programs and contexts,
Asplund's potency in managing the above
agenda is revealed.
In the Law Courts Addition to Tessin's Town
Hall (1672), Asplund accepts the urban,
neoclassic context of Gustaf Adolf Square as
binding. The facade facing the square ap-
pears as two frames, a symmetrical, neoclas-
sical one and a modem structural grid, that
embrace a yellow fenestrated plane layered
behind them. In extending the yellow plane
behind his grid, Asplund provides a common
inner surface, or datum, that binds the dis-
parate natures ofthe two outer structures to-
gether. Asplund's structural grid, though
modem in appearance and construction, is
further regulated both vertically and horizon-
tally by the rhythms and proportions of
Tessin's original facade. This results in a
compositional wholeness, yet each frame
reads as a temporally different structure.
The asymmetrical placement of the window
openings coupled with the neutrality of the
structural grid emphasizes the subordinate
relationship of the addition to the original
building. The nuances of the place, both the
square and the town hall, are maintained: the
form of the addition is cultivated from the
particular qualities of the extant environ-
ment, from the urban scale through the de-
tailed development of the elements compris-
ing the facade.
In plan. Asplund reciprocates Tessin's U-
shaped building order in a twofold manner.
First, an interior atrium is formed that ex-
perientially extends the existing exterior light
court into his composition, a space with both
internal and external components separated
by a glass curtain wall. This act continues
the tradition found in nineteenth- and early-
twentieth-century Scandinavian civic archi-
tecture that uses courtyards as a primary
ordering device—Ragnar Ostberg's Stock-
holm City Hall, with its exterior and interior
courts, is an obvious precedent." Second,
Asplund's plan order corresponds directly to
Tessin's. for room and corridor widths of the
original plan are consciously extended into
the new. In contrast to the orthogonal regu-
larity ofTessins plan, and the exterior struc-
tural frame of the addition, the interior
atrium incorporates flgural or curved forms,
spaces, and elements. The universal exterior
grid has given way to the particular crafting
of the interior atrium space. The walls and
balustrades forming the atrium are wood
paneled, further contrasting with the ma-
sonry walls of Tessin's court.
The wood -paneled walls and balustrades of
the atrium convey a tactility and tangibility
that speak of the civic and social propriety of
the space. Asplund's white exterior struc-
tural grid is revealed as cream colored,
curved, H-shaped columns in the atrium.
The columns and the secondary elements
within the atrium—stairs, elevator, clock,
and planting—combine with the rich, warm-
colored wood paneling to achieve a wholly
Scandinavian quality. Surfaces are real,
tangible, to be experienced by the body as
well as the eye. The skylight bathes the space
in the ever changing light from the Swedish
sky, a constant reminder of the daily and
yearly cycles ofthe natural world outside. In-
flection to the local condition, both cultural
and physical, has critically modified the
universalizing tendencies of Functionalism.
A monumental vista is presented those ap-
proaching Asplund's Woodland Cremato-
rium: an ensemble composed of strategically
positioned architectural elements
—
proces-
sional walk, wail, loggia, cross, and medita-
tion grove on raised mound—placed within a
gently sloping landscape contained by dark
forest edges. The naturalistic aspects of the
site appear dominant, for the buildings seem
subordinate to the dramatic landscape. But
Asplund did more than enhance the site
features: he recrafted a former gravel pit to
create a resonant dialogue between building
form and landscape. The vitality of this
dialogue is facilitated by the open vistas that
enframe and articulate the presence of the
architectural objects, as they stand dis-
Figure 3. Ame Jacobsen and Erik Moller. Town
Hall. Arhus. Denmark. 1939-42 (photo: author).
cretely and statically in the space of the site.
It is the architectural elements, in fact, which
gather the sky and earth together, establish-
ing the place of human action in the setting.
Stuart Wrede has discussed the influences
which informed Asplund's sensibility con-
cerning landscape design from its earliest
manifestations in the Woodland Cemetery
design done with Sigurd Lewerentz in 1915.'^
Asplund draws heavily from Nordic land-
scape painters ofthe late 1890s, who were, in
turn, influenced by the German romantic
painter Caspar David Friedrich. Friedrich's
paintings, as Wrede notes, contained numer-
ous "archetypal Nordic landscape images": in
particular, "the deep evergreen forest with
graves set in the surrounding wilderness, the
church with surrounding churchyard, and
the dolmen and earth mound on the heath
surrounded by oaks and the wayfarer's
cross." '^
While these images are integral to Asplund
and Lewerentz's cemetery design, in the
Woodland Crematorium they are applied in
an almost painterly fashion. Asplund not
only draws upon this romantic heritage but
fuses two other traditions of practice into the
development of the crematorium: the classi-
cal and the vernacular.
A long, low wall leads to the classical loggia
that crowns the ensemble, rooting the com-
plex on the rolling landscape. Courtyards
and a layered series of walls form the two
smaller chapels in the composition. Wall and
courtyard are common elements associated
with the Swedish vernacular building tradi-
tion. The loggia is balanced in space by the
tree-bedecked meditation mound, while the
wayfarer's cross acts as a vertical counter-
point between the two. The roof of the loggia
slopes down to an opening in its center over
an impluvium. while John Lundqvist's
sculpture Resurrection rises through the
opening in the roof. The cave-like interior of
the main chapel contrasts with the openness
of the loggia; moreover, it gestures to the
earthen hill of the meditation grove, which
recalls ancient burial mounds. The materials
used in the complex consciously reinforce the
dialectic nature of the elements. Against the
verdure of the site, the rough stone path and
smooth stuccoed wall lead to the dressed,
cream-colored sonte walls of the chapels and
the columns that form the loggia. Contrast is
provided by the dark granite cross, the wood
beams and decking of the loggia ceiling, and
the gray stucco and concrete interior of the
main chapel. Asplund's use of material
conveys essential knowledge about the pur-
pose ofeach element in the composition, and
he exploits the full range of experiential and
tactile potentials latent in the corporeal na-
ture of these materials.
At the time ofhis death in 1940, Asplund had,
as shovm in the Law Courts Addition and the
Woodland Crematorium, developed a strat-
egy of resistance against modernism's reli-
ance on universal technique. These works
represent a tactic that included reincorporat-
ing the vital heritages of the past, as well as
revitalizing the experiential and tactile ca-
pacities of architecture. His is a resonant
architecture that eschewed the trivializing
potentials of a nostalgic, or allusion-based,
architecture.
Aalto
The Villa Mairea (1938-39) is Alvar Aalto's
pivotal work of this period, for it completes
the move away from Functionalism that was
emerging in such works as the Viipuri Library
(1930-35), the Tallinn Art Gallery project
(1936), his own house at Munkkiniemi
(1936), and the Finnish Pavilion for the 1937
World's Fair. In the Villa Mairea, Aalto codi-
fies and reveals the themes that characterize
his mature works for the next three dec-
ades—the Finnish Pavilion for the 1939 New
York Worid's Fair, the Saynatsalo Town Hall
(1950-52), the Pedagogical University in
Jyvaskyla (1953-56), the Rautatalo Building
(1953-55), the Public Pensions Institute
(1952-56), the Vuoksenniska Church (1957-
59), and the complexes at Seinajoki and
Wolfsburg.
In the Villa Mairea, Aalto carves a place in the
Finnish forest by forming an L-shaped build-
ing block around an exterior courtyard
space, a courtyard completed by landscape
elements—stone walls, stepped terraces and
earth berms, a wooden gate, and trees.
Within the L-shaped block, the spatial hier-
archy of the plan order is revealed through
volumetric expression and material usage.
The whitewashed masonry L-shape denotes
the utilitarian or private spaces of the house,
while figural forms and shapes executed in
wood, tile, stone, and large glazed openings
signify the honorific or living spaces of the
dwelling. A free-form plunge pool is placed
next to the sauna in the courtyard, while the
undulating entrance canopy and the curved,
wood-sided, sloped-roof studio space seem to
fragment and erode the regularized geometry
of the white L-shaped building mass. This
dialectic between regularized building form
and especially configured elements charac-
terizes Aalto's work from this time on. More-
over, the sauna has a sod roof, while vines
climb over the surface of the building upon
poles placed there for just that purpose. The
living spaces ofthe Villa Mairea contain a rich
tapestry of textures and materials. Floor and
ceiling patterns articulate various subspaces
within the large living area—sitting room,
music room, library, and solarium. Struc-
ture, in the form of leather-wrapped or verti-
cally wood-stripped columns, reinforces the
spatial order: when combined with the
numerous wooden poles used throughout
the living spaces, the columns provide the
image of a private interior forest.
The courtyard, the differentiation of honorific
from utilitarian spaces in plan and volumet-
rics. the planting, the manipulation of light,
the use of multiple textures and materials,
and the creation of undulating surfaces and
forms cire all hallmarks of Aaltos mature
style. The courtyard, which Aalto used to
order works from dwelling to civic center, not
only establishes a place in the Finnish forest,
but provides a setting for communal activ-
ity—be it familial or civic. Moreover, it is a
mnemonic device: it recalls the exterior
courtyards around which Finnish farm com-
plexes and city houses were traditionally
organized. Thus the courtyard's use is espe-
cially fitting in the Villa Mairea, for it roots the
building to site as well as to cultural tradi-
tion. Most of Aalto's domestic and civic
courtyards are grass surfaced, continuing
the remembrances of the grass courts in
traditional Finnish dwellings. The differen-
tiation between honorific and utilitarian
spaces informs most of Aalto's building or-
ders. Important rooms are articulated
through unique shaping in plan, section, and
volumetrics, and they stand unsuppressed
within the common, ordinary order accorded
the remaining spaces. The Villa Mairea's
entrance canopy and second-floor study
become the town hall council chambers,
auditoria, library reading rooms, and lecture
halls in Aalto's civic buildings. That Aalto
uses figural or undulating forms and shapes
to signify these important rooms reinforces
their prominence and position in his compo-
sitions.
In Mairea, vines not only cover the exterior
form but are introduced as an essential ele-
ment in the major interior living spaces.
Planting becomes a regular feature of the
exteriors and interiors of numerous Aalto
works. Nature is allowed to engage the built
form, a reminder that it is always present to
reclaim our works if we lack care in our
stewardship of the environment. The sod-
roofed sauna, coupled with the recurring
presence of the growing vines, continually
reminds us of nature's closeness. Aalto's use
of planting not only roots his works to the
Figure 4. Erik Bryggman. Resurrection Chapel.
Turku. Finland. 1938-40 (photo: author).
immediate forest context and the rhjrthmic
cycle of the natural order, but speaks of the
potential antagonism between built form and
nature.
Materials are used in Mairea not only for their
specific corporeal and tactile qualities, but
also to provide essential information about
the use and importance of the various spaces
and elements. A propriety ofuse is conveyed,
for utilitarian areas are treated with ordinary
materials, while important spaces and forms
are finished with materials that support their
special purposes. The richness of Aalto's
palette of materials is reinforced through
tactile variations and finish qualities. That
the living areas in Mairea have large glazed,
openings on both the court and forest sides
acknowledges Aalto's sensitivity to the ma-
nipulation of light. Not only can one sit in
these spaces and see both forest and open
court, one is aware of the entirely different
qualities of light that each imparts. The
vocabulary ofwindow openings developed for
the villa speaks not only for the differing
quality of light necessary for a particular
space, but acknowledges the honorific or
utilitarian status of the respective rooms.
The Villa Mairea encapsulates the themes
Aalto explored during the remainder of his
career. His humanistic intent, based upon
reintegrating the individual with nature and
revitalizing the experiential qualities ofarchi-
tecture, was neither sentimental nor superfi-
cial. Instead, Aalto demonstrated the ability
to transform vital heritages and traditions
into a multi-valent architecture, an architec-
ture which continues to provide essential
lessons for contemporary practice.
Conclusion
Much of Scandinavian architecture after
World War II continued to develop along the
path taken by most Nordic architects during
the 1930s. These architects did not relin-
quish using industrial processes as a design
technique. Instead, they continued to bal-
ance Functionalist tenets with regional tradi-
tions in an attempt to bringmodem ideas into
a closer correspondence with local condi-
tions; and they tried to expand Functional-
ism's repertoire of expression by broadening
its boundaries rather than renouncing it out
of hand. This represented the view that the
necessary modification of modem architec-
ture would come from a judicious mixing of
modern technique and the traditional forms
and materials associated with regional histo-
ries. This activated a design dialogue be-
tween the generalizing qualities of universal
methods and the specifics of regional expres-
sion, but it was a somewhat flaccid one. The
results are epitomized by the doldrums wit-
nessed throughout Scandinavia following the
war. that competent but boring anonymity
associated with Swedish "empiricism" and
Danish "impeccability."
Aalto and Asplund, on the other hand, pre-
sented a markedly different attitude about
architectural production, one based upon
critical resistance. Their resistance was
grounded in a practice that examined the role
architecture plays in reclaiming the essen-
tials of human experience for the individual
in modem mass society, thus counteracting
the reliance on modem technique. Their
practices, then, differed not only from those
of their contemporaries during the 1930s,
but from much that influences architectural
production today. Our present attitude of
production seems to embody a practice of
currency: our procedures and values are
rooted within the norms ofthe contemporary,
and are defined by the realm of actions, com-
petencies, and attitudes held as immediate
by any number of our peers. Within this
practice, actions regarding the influence
accorded regional norms are all too often
manifested in a direct, "quotational" way:
they are source specific and allusion based.
Neither Asplund nor Aalto was bound to
source in this manner; instead they proffered
a strategy to recapture architecture's role in
everyday life by returning to the tangible
realities of place, memory, and experience.
Notes
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this article. Special thanks go to Mrs. Elissa
Aalto for her generosity and assistance in
granting me access to the archives of the
Aalto office: and to Ms. Sirkka Valento, head
of the archives at the Museum of Finnish
Architecture, for her assistance.
1 Quoted in Kirmo Mikkola "Pa spaning
efter en nutid" (Looking for the Present Time),
in Nordisk Funktionalism Arkitectur Forlag
AB (Stockholm) 1980, p. 72.
2 In addition to the critical journals that
appeared during this period
—
Kritisk Revy
(Denmark), Plan (Norway), and Tulenkantqja
(Finland)—many architects used both
newpapers and popular magazines as forums
for their ideas. A number of articles and
interviews by Aalto, for Instance, appeared in
the popular press beginning in the late
1920s; (see William C. Miller, AlvarAalto: An
Annotated Bibliography (Garlcmd Publishing
[New York] 1984).
3 In Finland, the Rationalization of the
One-Family House exhibition occurred in
1930, and a housing competition for Nordic
Construction Day was held in 1932. In
Sweden a low-cost housing competition was
held in 1932, and the Standard 34 housing
exhibition took place in Stockholm in 1934.
Many of the works seen in these exhibitions
and competitions were based upon ideas that
came from the 1929 C.I.A.M. exhibition die
Wohnungfur das Existensminimum.
4 G. Asplund, W. Gahn. S. Markelius, G.
Paulsson, E. Sundahl. and U. Ahren Accep-
tera [To Accept) Private printing (Stockholm)
1931 (reprinted 1980).
5 Nordisk Funktionalism provides a good
synopsis of this issue.
6 Esbjorn Hiort Nyere Dansk Bygn-
ingskunst—Contemporary Danish Architec-
ture Jul. Gjellerups Forlag (Copenhagen)
1949, p. 47.
7 Ibid., p. 24.
8 Alvar Aalto "Rationalismen och Manni-
skan" (Rationalism and Man) Lecture deliv-
ered to the Swedish Craft Society, 9 May
1935. Quoted in Goran Schildt. ed. Alvar
Aalto: Sketches MIT Press (Cambridge,
Mass.) 1978, p. 48.
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GillandandD. Woodcock ACSA and Informa-
tion Djmamics (Washington, D.C.) 1984, pp.
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Demetri Porphyrios Sources oJModem Eclec-
ticism: Studies on Alvar Aalto Academy
Editions (London) 1982.
9 Alvar Aalto 'The Humanizing of Archi-
tecture" The Technology Review (November
1940): 14-16.
10 GunnarAsplund "KonstochTeknik" (Art
and Technology) Speech presented to the
Swedish Architectural Association, 1936.
Quoted in Stuart Wrede The Architecture of
Erik GunnarAsplund MIT Press (Cambridge,
Mass.) 1980. p. 153.
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Concerning the influence of Ostberg on
Asplund. see Wrede, Architecture of Erik
GunnarAsplund. pp. 1-76.
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The legacy of Mies and creativity: there are
those who see a built-in contradiction here:
an oxymoron as it were.
They point to the large number of bad
imitations of Mies's buildings and to Mies's
statement that he had intended to create
an architectural language and
—
"ipsa re"—
the indictment is made. One adds to that
the perception that Mies worked within a
very narrow vocabulary of both materials
and forms: that he was a strict classicist
whose buildings—despite their being
elegantly proportioned and meticulously
detailed—were cold and inhuman and the
case for the proposition that the Miesian
legacy is inimical to creativity is clinched.
All this, however, is based on an improper
definition of creativity and on a profound
misunderstanding of the true nature of
Mies's work and teaching.
Creativity is not indulgence. Viewed in the
proper light, Mies's statement that "Archi-
tecture has nothing to do with the inven-
tion of forms" can be wonderfully liberating,
while at the same time it escalates the level
of creativity required in the making of a
meaningful architecture.
In the late 1940s, Philip Johnson said to a
group of students at Pratt Institute: "Gen-
tlemen, when you are working on a design
problem, you have three choices: you can
imitate Frank Lloyd Wright, you can imitate
Le Corbusier or you can imitate Mies. The
choice is entirely up to you, though person-
ally 1 would recommend that you imitate
Mies, because it's easier to do it well."' If
students are led to believe that architecture
does, in fact, deal with the invention of
forms, they will—they usually do—resort to
imitating the work of others, an equally
meaningless endeavor, whether their model
is Mies or Michael Graves.
It is important to understand how inade-
quate is the description of Mies as a
classicist. In the entire history of the
architecture of the Western world there
have been two major movements: the
Gothic and the Classical. They parallel the
great divisions in literature, music, or
painting: romantic and classical, lyrical
and rational, the Yin and Yang of the
worlds of intellect and art.
Gothic architecture is dynamic, exhilarat-
ing, brooding, and awe-inspiring. It was
adopted by the romantic poets and novel-
ists of the 19th century. In specific archi-
tectural terms it is the embodiment of
structure, clearly conceived and clearly
expressed.
Above all, however, Gothic architecture is
characterized by the impulse to articulate.
Each element of the plan and of the
structure is made to stand out sharply.
Each of the chapels surrounding the
chevet of a Gothic cathedral is read as a
discrete volume, both internally and
externally. Each sinew of the structure,
each vault, each groin rib, each flying
buttress is clearly articulated. (A parallel,
as Panofsky has pointed out, to the
schemata of the Thomistic philosophers.)
Classical architecture, on the other hand,
is dominated by the unifying impulse.
The same spirit that subjects the tragedies
of Comeille and Racine to the "n.ile of 3
unities" (unity of action, unity of time, and
Ludwig Mies van der Rohe. Crown Hall. Illinois Institute ofTechnology. Chicago. 1 952-56 (photo:
Botond Bognarj.
unity of place) characterizes all classical
architecture. Everything is subordinated
to the overall composition. Instead of ar-
ticulating the elements of the plan, the
building makes a broad, generalized
statement. The chapels in a Renaissance
church are given no expression on the
exterior.
The dominance of the horizontal line, the
way in which the building, so often, is
placed on a podium, all serve to under-
score the aura of statelines, serenity, and
repose that characterize Classical architec-
ture.
1 submit that the goal of Mies's work was
an enormously amibitious one: nothing
less than the creation of a new synthesis of
the two major strains of Western architec-
ture: the Gothic and the Classical. Mies
never made an explicit statement to that
effect, of course. But then, there were a lot
of things about his work, concerning
which Mies never made an explicit state-
ment. It is difficult to know even to what
extent, if any, he articulated this goal to
himself. But, conscious or not, the
evidence is overwhelming that—increas-
ingly, as his career progressed—Mies was
working towards just such a synthesis. In
the Barcelona pavilion, the separation of
column and wall was the kind of articula-
tion that is quintessentially Gothic, while
the placement on the podium, the strong
hovering horizontal plane, the stateliness of
the composition are, all. strongly Classical.
The l.I.T. Library & Administration Build-
ing project is strongly Gothic. It is in
Crown Hall (1956) and in the Bacardi
project for Santiago. Cuba (1957) that we
see the full realization of this synthesis,
and it finally reaches a climax in the
National Gallery in Berlin. The stateliness
and serenity of the building, the noble
proportions, the way it is placed on its
podium, the bi-axial symmetry of its
structure—all these qualities bestow upon
it, as so many critics have done, the label
of Classical. But, behold the total clarity
with which the structure is expressed.
Notice, in particular, the juncture of the
cruciform column, to the roof structure by
means of a pin joint. This kind of articula-
tion is nothing if not thoroughly Gothic in
spirit. We are in the presence here, of a
new architectural language, which is rooted
in the past; a true synthesis of spirit, not of
forms.
Here it should be said that Mies's increas-
ing preoccupation with the creation of so-
called universal spaces ( a term, inciden-
tally, he never used) can be seen in two
ways: First, as a manifestation of the
Classical spirit. Secondly, as the proper
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response to the fact that we live in a
society characterized by nothing so much
as by change, change at an exponential
rate. In such a society, it is extremely
unlikely that a building will serve the
program for which it was designed
throughout its physical life.
The view that Mies's goal was to fuse the
two major strains of architecture into a
single, new language is consistent with the
way he, himself, tried to define the task of
architecture, in his 1960 acceptance
speech of the A.l.A. Gold Medal. He spoke
of the need for clarity and of the dawning
of a new architecture, then went on to say:
"In all these years 1 have learned more and
more that architecture is not a play with
forms. 1 have come to understand the
close relationship between architecture
and civilization. 1 have learned that
architecture must stem from the sustain-
ing and driving forces of civilization and
that it can be, at its best, an expression of
the innermost structure of its time."
Later, in the same speech, he said:
"Architecture should be related only to the
most significant forces in the civilization.
Only a relationship which touches the
essence of time can be real. This relation 1
call a truth relation. Truth Is in the sense
of Thomas Aquinas, as the 'Adequatio
intellectus et reV. Or, as a modem philoso-
pher expresses it: Truth is the signifi-
cance of facts". Only such a relation is able
to embrace the complex nature of civiliza-
tion. Only so, will architecture be involved
in the evolution of civilization. And only
so, will it express the slow unfolding of its
form. This has been, and will be, the task
of architecture. A difficult task, to be sure.
But Spinoza has taught us that great
things are never easy. They are as difficult
as they are rare."^
The very enormity of the task (or tasks)
which Mies pursued throughout his work
(whether consciously defined or not) helps
explain why a number of other considera-
tions were largely absent from his agenda:
ecology and energy conservation for ex-
ample. (One should also remember,
incidentally, that Mies was working in the
U.S. at a time when it was clear to everyone
that energy was limitless and very, very
cheap.)
An extension of Mies's original agenda
affords rich and meaningful opportunities
to apply one's creativity. So do newly
emerging forces at work in our society, and
new technologies.
One concern that was not left out of Mies's
agenda was contextualism. Beginning with
the Bismarck monument, projected in
1910 and using the technique, which he
pioneered, of combining a photograph of
the actual site with a rendering or model
photograph of the proposed building, Mies
painstakingly investigated the relationship
between the building and its environs.
Nowhere was this done more painstakingly
than in one of his last projects, the one for
the Mansion House office building in
London (1967). Many composite photo-
graphs—which have not been published
—
show that he was carefully looking at the
building as it would appear in the context
of the square, on which it was going to be
located, from side streets leading to the
square and, even as It would appear on the
skyline when seen from across the
Thames.
The most common misconception of Mies's
work and teaching is that they are, some-
how, canonical. To be sure, there have
been, and still are, those who feel com-
pelled, simply, to copy the external appear-
ance of Mies's buildings. They are no
better, and no worse, than those who copy
Gabriel or Ledoux.
Mies, In his own work, was anything but
canonical. There Is a tendency to think of
his work as being rigidly rectilinear—and
then one remembers the mid-thirties
project for a courthouse with a garage or
the second version of the Ulrich Lange
house, to say nothing of the mid-sixties
Houston museum. There is a tendency to
think of him as working with a very limited
palette of colors and materials—and then
one thinks of the Barcelona pavilion, with
its onyx, green marble, and red silk cur-
tain; of the Mannheim theater project,
where those who saw the actual model
remember the bright gold and turquoise
silk crutalns of the two auditoria or of the
bronze muUlons, amber glass, and green
marble panels of the Seagram building.
And so on. . . .
The architectural language which Mies
sought to create is a language of ideas, not
of forms. There is nothing prescriptive, or
proscriptive, about it. The only proscrip-
tion was uttered by Mies when he said: "1
don't want to be interesting—1 want to be
good."^ This is, of course, a difficult path to
follow, but creativity does not come easily.
What Mies tried to teach us was the need
to strive for clarity and for order. Order is
perceived by some as being inimical to
creativity, but nothing could be further
from the truth. As an example: What
could be more creative than a performance
by a small group of first-rate jazz musi-
cians? The tune they start playing is only
a point of departure for a series of sponta-
neous improvisations in which the music is
created while it is being played. This is
happening within a very strongly ordered
framework, created by the beat, laid down
by the rhythm section, and the formal
structure, say, the blues (12 bars. AAB,
CCD, etc.).
In his 1938 inaugural address, Mies talked
about order. "Every decision leads to a
special kind of order" he said, and went on
to explain that neither the mechanistic
principle of order with its overemphasis on
materialistic factors nor the idealistic, with
its overemphasis on the ideal and the
formal, were adequate.
been designed by Mies?" What happened,
of course, was that after two years of inten-
sive study with Mies, neither of those two
concerns held any significance. He had
learned that the only thing that mattered
was to make a good building. He had been
set free.
1 Personal communication with John C.
Hoops.
2 Philip Johnson Mies van der Rohe.
Museum of Modem Art (New York) 1953,
p. 199.
3 Recorded interview.
4 David Spaeth Mies van der Rohe. Rizzoli
International (New York) 1985, pp. 173-74.
"So we shall emphasize the organic prin-
ciple of order as a means of achieving the
successful relationship of the parts to each
other and to the whole. And here we shall
take our stand."''
As stated earlier, the architectural lan-
guage which Mies sought to create—which
is a large part of his legacy to us—is a
language of ideas, not of forms. It has to
do with clarity and order, with discipline
and craftsmanship, or—to try to sum it all
up in a single word, which best character-
izes Mies's entire work: integrity.
The question of appearance, or mimetism,
is irrelevant. If one may end on a personal
note: A young architect (the author) about
to leave Berkeley, California (where he had
completed his undergraduate studies) for
Chicago, suddenly broke out in a cold
sweat: "What am I doing?" he said to
himself. "1 am about to go to l.l.T. and
study with Mies for two years, at the end of
which 1 will be an architectural cripple,
incapable of designing a building which
does not look as if it had been done by
Mies." But it was too late for second
thoughts and arrive in Chicago he did.
There, after meeting the Master, looking at
his buildings and at the work done by
previous students, he was, again, seized by
panic: "What if—he now said to himself^
"even after studying with Mies for two
years, 1 still may not be able to do build-
ings which will look as if they had
Mies and the Baukunst
An Oriental Connection?
David Spaeth
University o' Kentucky
What is right and signijlcant in any era is to
give the spirit an opportunity for existence.
—Ludwig Mies van der Rohe
What someone learns is as important as how
he learns. In the case ofLudwig Mies van der
Rohe (1886-1969). this is especially true.
Mies was largely self-taught as a profes-
sional. He attended Aachen's Domschule
from 1892 to 1899 and a local trade school,
the Spenrathschule. from 1899 to 1901.
When his formal education ended he was
fifteen years old. With typical understate-
ment, he described his training as an archi-
tect as follows: "1 had no conventional archi-
tectural education. 1 worked under a few
good architects; 1 read a few good books—and
that's about it."'
One of these few good architects was Peter
Behrens, from whom, Mies said, he "learned
great form." From H. P. Berlage, whose work
he studied during an extended visit to Hol-
land (191 1-12). Mies said he "learned great
structure." Mies's appreciation of Behrens's
"form" and Berlage's "structure" did not over-
come the enduring influence of Karl Friedrich
Schinkel (1781-1841) on his work. For Mies,
the influence ofGermany's leading neoclassi-
cal architect of the nineteenth century was
something to be struggled with. According to
him, "After Berlage 1 had to fight with myself
to get away from the classicism of Schinkel. "^
He never really did, and his work, 1 would
argue, is the better for it.
It was Frank Lloyd Wright's influence on Mies
that was less literal and more subtle than
Schinkel's. In an exhibition catalog of
Wright's work, Mies summed up Wright's
influence on European architects in 1910,
when a major exhibition of his work was
mounted and a portfolio of his drawings
published: 'The dynamic impulse emanating
from his work invigorated a whole generation.
His influence was strongly felt even when it
was not actually visible."^
In actuality, Mies learned about the art of
making buildings as much by carefully look-
ing at buildings, studying their use of mate-
rials, their structure and proportions, as he
did from his "masters," Schinkel, Behrens,
Berlage, and Wright. Years after his depar-
ture from his hometown of Aachen, Mies
recalled the buildings he knew in his youth
and their influence on his education as an
architect: 'They were medieval buildings, not
with any special character but they were
really built."*
To Mies, the most significant characteristic of
these structures was not their Gothic drama,
their decoration, or their materials: rather,
he admired the unity and solidity of their
construction. In Mies's work, the putting
together of parts, the act ofconstruction, had
an almost mystical quality, one he ap-
proached with religious fervor. At his inau-
guration as Director of Architecture at Ar-
mour (later Illinois) Institute of Technology
(1938), Mies expanded upon this perception:
"Where can we find greater structural clarity
than in the wooden buildings of old? Where
else can we find such unity of material, con-
struction and form? Here the wisdom of
whole generations is stored. What feeling for
material and what power of expression there
is in these buildings. What warmth and
beauty they have! They seem to be echoes of
old songs. "^
The buildings are united by the fact that each
example has something to do with structure.
By structure. Mies meant a "complete mor-
phological organism,"*^ not merely a set of
beams, girders, and columns: and when
discussing either his work or that of his
students, Mies preferred to term it Baukunst
rather than the more accepted Architektur.
This compound of two German nouns held a
clearer meaning for him than did the term
architecture
—
'bau the construction and
fcunst just a refinement of that and nothing
more."^ It was. then, the possibility of refin-
ing a system ofconstruction that offered Mies
the greatest potential, the greatest challenge:
"1 desire the absence of architecture and 1
practice—the art of building."*
Given this, it is easy to understand and
appreciate his fascination with skeleton
construction. He came to understand both
steel and reinforced concrete structures as
"skeletons by nature. No gingerbread. No
fortress. Columns and girders eliminate
bearing walls. This is skin and bone con-
struction."^ Where is the structure more
clear than in a skeleton? It is tantalizing to
see in his "skin and bone" structures a con-
nection, an affinity with Oriental philosophy
and construction. During a visit to Japan in
1953, one of Mies's students, Werner Blaser,
noticed the similarities between Mies's ap-
proach to construction and that of the Japa-
nese, in which there is a "clear separation of
'skin and skeleton'. . . ."'"
The German Pavilion for the International
Exposition, Barcelona, 1929, is an excellent
example of similarities between Japanese
architecture and Mies's work. The Barcelona
Pavilion, as it is more familiarly termed, was
the clearest realization (to that date) of Mies's
ideas about space and Baukunst. Such a
realization was not, however, arrived at eas-
ily. Several, more conventional solutions
preceded the final plan for the pavilion. The
first plan, completed late in 1928, was for a
covered area the same size as the one con-
structed, with the roof plane supported on a
series of bearing walls. Spatially, it was not
unlike his plan for a brick country house from
1923 where wall planes extend beyond the
roofs perimeter to engage the landscape. A
second plan, architectonically not unlike the
first, utilized both walls and columns to carry
the roofload. In his last plan, the one actually
constructed, the weight of the roof plane is
carried on columns only: walls become a
series of "optional" and visually "light" non-
loadbearing screens. The intellectual and
visual separation of structural and non-
structural building elements allowed for
space to be defined and articulated in a new
way. It represented, as Mies described the
"shock," the discovery of a "new principle.""
The Barcelona Pavilion had no real program,
as that term is understood and used by
architects today. It was to be whatever Mies
chose to make of it. Its sole function was to
accommodate a reception for the King and
Queen of Spain as they signed the "Golden
Book" officially opening the exposition. The
pavilion had the symbolic role of representing
Germany among the nations participating in
the exposition. Its design is in striking con-
trast to the prevalent neo-renaissance and
neo-baroque styles of the neighboring build-
ings. However, in its precision and refine-
ment, Mies's pavilion was the epitome of
German craftsmanship and industry, a
metaphor for technology in the twentieth
century. Further, he was able to represent
this metaphor three dimensionally, in the
clearest possible way, because the abstract
nature of the building's program allowed him
to concentrate totally on the idea of space. As
a spatial continuum, the pavilion transcends
the physical limitations of its site as well as
the physical definition of space which walls,
floors, and roofplane traditionally made. The
space Mies created has the quality of a
Mobius strip in that, as one moved through it,
what was first perceived as inside is, in
actuality, outside, though a more defined
outside to be sure.
This spatial ambiguity characteristic of
Mies's work was also noted by Arthur Drex-
ler, in a different context and in connection
with Chinese architecture. Describing Mies's
1938 project for three courtyard houses,
Drexler noted: "Like a Chinese palace the
scheme reveals fascinating pockets and al-
coves, courts within courts. Like Chinese
architecture too, it juxtaposes the satisfac-
tion of the imperturbable wall with the mys-
tery of space while preserving the order of
visible structure."'^
of a building might be placed, a physical and
intellectual continuum. For Mies, it made
sense to use the same module in subsequent
work only if both the program and the struc-
ture were the same as another building's.
The results of Mies's approach are startlingly
similar to those ofthe Japanese; like them, he
adopted and used the module as an ordering
device and the skeleton structure to establish
an organic order for architecture, to manifest
the Baukunst both of and in his work. There
is a pervading concern for "aesthetic balance"
in Mies's work and the Oriental, to which
Blaser refers, which borders on obsession.
There is also a Zen-like preoccupation in
Mies's concern for balance and proportion as
well as in his attention to detail. Stories
abound about how he would spend hours
contemplating the disposition of horizontal
and vertical elements in an elevation, the
placement of a work of art on a wall, or the
nuance of shadows cast by various flange
thicknesses of the window mullions—as in
the Seagram Building.
What such accounts tell us is not that Mies
was a very patient man—he was—but that for
him the making of any aesthetic judgment
carried with it a profound sense of responsi-
bility to be the best, to do the best, at all levels.
As Kakuzo Okakura observed in another
context: "A special contribution of Zen to
Eastern thougjit was its recognition of the
mundane as of equal importance with the
spiritual. It held that in the great relation of
things there was no distinction of small and
great, an atom possessing equal possibilities
with the universe."'^
It was also characteristic ofMies's work to set
forth an articulated and ordered skeletal
structure, the visible structure to which
Drexler refers, on a plane defined with a grid
or module. Unlike the Japanese use of a
module, the tatami mat, that culture's more
or less universal device for ordering space,
Mies's use of the module knew no absolute
proportions or fixed dimensions. In his work,
the size of the module derived organically
from the requirements of the building prob-
lem at hand. His attempt was to estabfish a
general order into which the disparate parts
For Mies, the making of architecture was a
moral act, "a communion with the essentials
of our civilization," one that carried with it
individual and collective responsibifity to
build, or cause to be built, that which embod-
ies the spirit of the times, the Zeitgeist, with
the highest and best technique, the
Baukunst. Such an attitude is predicated on
Mies's belief that the highest human en-
deavor, the making of architecture, is a mode
of spiritual expression, the vehicle as well as
the manifestation of the Zeitgeist. The paral-
lels we see between his work and the Oriental
strike us as profound because they have been
arrived at from quite different vantages.
There is a similarity ofmeans and ends, ofap-
preciation and understanding.
The Barcelona Pavilion clearly shows that
Mies understood that "the reality of a room
was to be found in the vacant space enclosed
by the roofand walls, not in the roofand walls
themselves."''* For achitectonic veracity, it is
not necessary in Mies's work or in traditional
Oriental construction for actual physical
connections between beams or between col-
umns and beams to be seen in order to be
understood and accepted. Other visual infor-
mation supplied in the skeleton construction
supports the perception that structural
members are connected to one another in an
appropriate and logical manner. Verisimili-
tude is accepted in place of verifiable truth.
Although Mies and the Oriental tradition of
construction have arrived at similar architec-
tural expressions for the skeleton, wherein
physical connections are suppressed and
spatial ambiguity is a mutual characteristic,
a gulfseparates the two. It is a gulfpredicated
on two different world views of the position
man and the things he has made occupy
relative to nature and the universe. Both
Mies and the Oriental attempt to place man-
made things in harmony with nature. In the
Oriental tradition, this is done so as to
humble man. to indicate his relative unim-
portance and subordination to a larger cos-
mology. Mies's work seeks no such subordi-
nation. Rather, through his work, the archi-
tect seeks a restoration of man, mankind,
and man-made things to the position they
occupied during the Renaissance: the center
of the universe. In seeking perfection for
man-made things, Mies seeks to elevate all
mankind to a noble, lofty realm.
In his lifetime and despite evidence to the
contrary, Mies saw a nobility in the works of
construction undertaken by man. He
sought, in his own work, to give architectural
expression to this essential nobility of spirit.
Mies sought to accomplish through architec-
ture what it has been said Winston Churchill
accomplished through writing, "to restore
meaning to such words as honor and glory
and majesty while conceptually restoring the
individual person once again to his place at
the center of the universe, the ruler rather
than the slave of the forces loosed by scien-
tific technology."'^
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Between the Ends and the Means
of Architecture
Andrzej Pinno
ty of Texas at Arlington
One of the hallmarks ofour scientific civiliza-
tion is its dependence on specialists. We need
them. Yet although life without experts
would be hard to imagine, the present over-
specialization carries with it a price tag. The
logic of its growth requires a constant nar-
rowing of focus in every field of study in order
to grasp its depth, to comprehend its details,
and to appreciate its inherent structure. As
the cliche goes, "we know more and more
about less and less." Consequently, mean-
ingful communication can exist only within a
small circle of highly knowledgeable special-
ists who are basically ignorant about other
specialists' domains. Thus our society be-
comes increasingly fragmented, heterogene-
ous, and helpless in the face of its own com-
plexity. Architecture is no exception:
Postmodernism, in contradistinction to
monolithic modernism, offers a multitude of
ideas, trends, and solutions focused usually
on particular problems or issues. Should we
instead seek a more holistic approach to
architecture or a synthesis of its various
concepts? This paper takes the risk of inves-
tigating these problems within a broad and
general framework. Of necessity it simplifies
the problems: however, I hope that it does not
oversimplify them.
The Time of Hope
Modem architecture, especially in the heroic
period, presented a unique opportunity for
architects. It was a period of high expecta-
tion, struggle, and hope. Together with many
intellectuals and artists, architects were able
to define with great clarity their goals and to
implement them with methods developed by
the exact sciences. Their objectives stemmed
from the perceptions about the Jin de siecle
society whose wrongs they wanted to rectiiy:
its industrial order of injustices, with wealth
and privileges on one side and poverty and
slums on the other: its industrial city of
contradictions, with great boulevards and
monuments on one side and pollution, con-
gestion, and chaos on the other; its bour-
geois, decadent culture with the pretentious
and, as they saw it. irrelevant art and archi-
tecture. They thought that they could im-
prove the built environment, thanks to their
intellectual frame of mind inherited from the
Enlightenment.
Enlightenment and, as we would say today,
its blind faith in rational thinking, was the
basis of one of the most fateful philosophical
systems: positivism. Within the rationalist
mode of thinking, positivism defined its posi-
tion toward reality: the world in its totality
was considered inaccessible to the human
mind and, to be comprehended, it had to be
reduced to those elements that could be
observed, identified, and explained—in
short, to the facts. Facts became the subject
matter of philosophy and a solid foundation
for science. After being measured and clas-
sified, they could easily be compared, repro-
duced, predicted, and, most importantly,
manipulated. These possibilities of the exact
sciences gave rise to another science: sociol-
ogy. It set as its goal the development of a
precise, unshakable, and "scientific" knowl-
edge of the human world. The social scien-
tists had at their disposal such positivist
ideas as the assumption that the human
world was of a similar order to that of the
material world, and that the methods of in-
quiry developed by the exact sciences could
be applied to the human sciences as well. In
other words, they could establish "universal
laws governing every observed phenomena"
and apply them toward the improvement of
society and the human environment.
For the first time in history, man saw himself
as a real master of the universe. But was he?
This newly acquired power contained the
seeds of defeat. The certainty which man
thus gained represented merely a tiny frac-
tion of reality—that which was measurable
and verifiable. Could man understand the
whole world by merely knowing the facts?
Despite these doubts, positivism declared its
total devotion to them and consequently
became a doctrine which rejected all spiritual
problems. "Suffering, death, ideological con-
flict, social clashes ... all are declared out of
bounds, matters we can only be silent about,
in obedience to the principle of verifiability."'
Modem architects equipped with such pow
erful ideas felt confident and enthusiastic
Their work would become rational and they
would waste no time on unnecessary con
cems with elusive values and metaphysics
The quantitative approach would gain re
spect and wide application, while the qualita
tive approach would be considered unscien
tific and unreliable. Indeed, they set to work
struggling against subjectivity in design and
such undefined terms as "taste" or "feeling."
When Le Corbusier suggested a rational
approach to function and structure, and
reduced the building to its five basic ele-
ments, he laid the foundations of a scientific
architecture for a new civilization. Likewise,
the identification of the four functions of the
city was supposed to provide an exact knowl-
edge of the way it worked. Today, pilotis.
horizontal windows, or a free plan can be
modified according to any need, taste, or
fashion, but the main idea of establishing
primary elements which can be assembled
into an architectural whole is with us to stay.
Similarly we do not have to divide the city into
functional zones, but when proposing a
mixed-use development, we clearly under-
stand all of its consequences. But perhaps it
was the belief in universal laws that gave
modem architects their arrogant conviction
that it was they who could decide how people
should live. work, and recreate. In spite of it.
however, the idea of positivism must have
been strong indeed to have inspired Le Cor-
busier to declare emphatically: "architecture
or revolution."
Soon the revolutionary ideas formulated by
the great masters of modernism were taken
over by ordinary architects and applied (per-
haps confirming Kuh's theory ofthe scientific
revolutions) to the enormous task of rebuild-
ing the towns and the cities destroyed during
World War 11. Unfortunately, the new theo-
ries did not have enough time to mature or to
adapt to our rapidly developing societies and
generated a built environment of dubious
quality. Also, the concentration on utility,
functionality, efficiency, and, at that time,
such fashionable problems as "growth and
change," "flexibility and adaptability," or "the
great number" were emphasized at the ex-
pense of esthetics or some "higher," perhaps
spiritual needs of man. Finally, man himself
was reduced to the role of a mere "user." So
it is no surprise that soon a reaction to those
uninspiring mass-produced buildings and
towns came from younger architects who
found the vocabulary ofmodem architecture
exhausted and its premises questionable.
Science too became aware of its shortcom-
ings. In spite of such well-known and appre-
ciated achievement of scientific civilization as
developments in biology, medicine, or elec-
tronics, or the advances of social well-being
in the developed countries, clouds started
gathering over its otherwise bright future.
The two world wars, the holocaust, the threat
ofnuclear war, the inability to control hunger
and famine, and the degradation of the envi-
ronment showed the inadequacy of positiv-
ism in dealing with reality and forced some
philosophers to question the foundations of
Western philosophy. Their beliefIn unlimited
progress began to dwindle and, again, the
question of man"s relation to the outside
world became their primary concern. Yet the
changes which occurred in philosophy took a
different turn. Instead of studying nature,
philosophy became concerned with the ex-
planation and expansion of scientific knowl-
edge, with the logic and precise methods of
the mathematical sciences. In this way posi-
tivism was transformed into logical positiv-
ism and became analytic philosophy: a
"super science." But as Richard Rorty sug-
gests, it was "left without ... a sense of
mission, or a metaphilosophy."^ It was left
without significant goals—without ends.
Architects, disappointed with the results of
their work, became increasingly interested in
scientific methods, too. "Operational re-
search," "systems analysis," or "decision
theory" attracted the attention of some archi-
tects and seemed to open new avenues in
place of the cul-de-sac of the modem move-
ment. Ludvig von Bertalanffy's "General
System Theory," Herbert Simon's 'The Sci-
ences ofthe Artificial," or the theories ofHorst
Rittel were the texts to be read. But not for
long. After the initial enthusiastic reception
of Christopher Alexander's "Notes on the
Synthesis of Form" another impasse was
reached. The previous optimism seemed to
wane and even "advocacy planning" or "par-
ticipatory design," in spite of their good inten-
tions, could not offer a breakthrough. Fi-
nally, the great unfulfilled promises of sci-
ence were perhaps symbolically summarized
in the science-fiction imagery of Archigram
and the Metabolists: the last "hurrah" of
progress.
The Time of Disillusionment
The disenchantment with analytic philo.so-
phy brought new ideas that began to domi-
nate the intellectual scene. They came in the
form of semiotics, structuralism, and later
post-structuralism. Semiotics, as formu-
lated by Ferdinand de Saussure, proposes
that languages are systems constituted by
arbitrary signs which, in turn, consist of
signifiers (words) and signifieds (concepts,
things). The essential and revolutionary idea
in Saussure's theory is that there is no natu-
ral connection between the two. Signifiers
are formed in an arbitrary way and, conse-
quently, their relation to signifieds is based
on convention and sanctioned by history. To
put it differently, signifiers are independent
of reality or self-referential. Following this
line of reasoning, semiotics approached lan-
guage not so much as an "imperfect" tool for
communicating knowledge (as analj^ic phi-
losophy would have it) but as an abstract
system whose intrinsic logic governs our
thinking. The relationship of signifiers and
signifieds takes over the relationship be-
tween mind and reality, and the previous
discussion of how our minds reach certainty
in constructing a picture of the outside world
is further reduced to problems ofthe internal
structure of language. This seems to be
another example of the reductionistic atti-
tude of science which leads students of liter-
ary texts to substituting syntax—an entity
ideally suited for objective, "scientific" analy-
sis—for content, the subject of qualitative
value-judgments.
For architects this new development means a
change of objectives. Architecture, like lin-
guistics, becomes independent of reality and
self-centered. Architects cease to be inter-
ested in the problems of the environment
surrounding them and concentrate instead
on buildings as signifying elements of archi-
tectural language. They appreciate the inter-
nal logic of design rather than functional
solutions or systems of construction; formal
aspects of architecture rather than its con-
tent or program: what their buildings express
rather than how they work. Thus architec-
ture becomes an abstract order of self-refer-
ential, formal statements with "syntax" being
its raison d'etre—its guarantee of a scientific
status.
Later, following the Saussurean insight,
Jacques Derrida concluded that, like the
existing gap between the signifiers and the
world they signify, so too there exists a chasm
between the written text and reality: the text
suppresses or hides some truths about the
world it describes. It is the role of the critic
and the reader to uncover them through a
particular analytical reading ofthe text called
deconstruction. But the question oftruthful-
ness of a written text is related to a quintes-
sential problem—that of truth itself. This
question—the philosophical view that there
is an objective truth about the world—consti-
tutes, according to Derrida, a false founda-
tion of Western philosophy which he calls
"logocentrism." To expose it, to put the
problem of the objective truth in the right
perspective becomes the main concern of
Derrida. Yet he realizes that the problem is so
deeply rooted in the tradition of Western
thinking that in order to overcome it he has to
combat not only logocentrism itself but the
way it is formulated: the text, including his
own, can be accused ofthe same suppression
of truth. Consequently, an auto-irony, a
search for new forms, a use ofnew words and
idioms, an obscurity of style become his
weapons. The ideas of Derrida generate
furious controversy. For some they represent
a mere passing fashion: for others, they
promise an end to the vicissitudes oflogocen-
trism with its ill-conceived search for pseudo-
truths: a new beginning for stagnant West-
em philosophy.
In spite of this controversy the Derridean
approach exerts a strong influence on archi-
tecture. Peter Eisenman, a true follower of
Derrida, tries to apply his ideas to architec
ture. Yet a movement that wants to free itself
from truth is unable to define its own ends.
Hence Eisenman searches for another archi-
tecture, an other—not a new—architecture,
for the word "other" suggests merely a differ-
ence, whereas the word "new" indicates a di-
rection, a value, a hierarchy. Consequently,
the concept of"other" leads to an architecture
"as is": architecture severed and shielded
from any external conditions or outside influ-
ences: architecture with its own intrinsic,
arbitrary logic expressed by such notions as
"traces," "grafts," "textuality," "recursivity,"
and so on: a self-referential architecture
trying to find its goals, its ends, its meaning
—
in itself.
The evolution of rationalism as described
here is of necessity overly briefand simple. In
reality it represents a long, dramatic struggle
for the human mind and soul. After three
hundred years of development, the hegem-
ony of rationalism over the human intellect
engulfed humanity and reached its logical
conclusion: the total rationalization of hu-
man life. From the rationalization of think-
ing, through the rationalization of the means
of production, we have reached the rationali-^
zation of the means ofexchange—of informa-
tion, of goods, and of cultures. From the
scientific civilization—the modem one—we
have moved to the consumer civilization—the
postmodern one. This "rational" process
brought a total commercialization of society,
of professions (health industry, education
industry, entertainment industry), of knowl-
edge (business or the know-how-oriented
university curricula), of culture (media-
dominated benign art, supporting rather
than opposing consumerism). Even archi-
tecture celebrates such symbols of commer-
cialism as Las Vegas, the "consumer spaces"
of Portman, or the lush coffee-table editions
of architectural books. Consequently, highly
developed societies are fragmented into spe-
cial-interest groups of overinformed and
undereducated individuals. And the loss of
certainty, the escape from the shackles of
reality, the pursuit of ambiguous successes,
leave us unable to talk to each other, or even
to formulate a basis for conversation.
The Secular World of Ambiguity
The description of the evolution of rational-
ism would not be complete without consider-
ing another factor that played a crucial role in
shaping our civilization: the secularization of
society. The death of God proclaimed by
Nietzsche has nurtured Western man since
the dawn ofthe Enlightenment. The rejection
of the sacred in the name of rational thinking
was supposed, as Kolakowski says, to liber-
ate man from all tradition, from all prees-
tablished meanings, and to open for him, on
the basis of his total autonomy, endless
opportunity for shaping his own fate. His
belief in the limitless malleability of the indi-
vidual and the endless potential for social
improvement led man to the Utopian belief in
constant progress. Thus progress became
man's ultimate goal, his moral obligation,
almost his raison d'etre. Overwhelmed by
this new opportunity, man was unable to
notice that this unlimited autonomy, instead
of giving him a Promethean power of self-
creation, led him to unrestricted fancies and
arbitrary decisions devoid of any criteria of
judgment. He measured the instruments of
progress, yet was unable to determine its
direction.
The rejection of the sacred deprives us of its
power for stabilizing and consolidating social
order, or to put it differently, removes the
limits that define man. The fruits of this
fateful development abound in our secular
society: when the state bureaucratizes such
previously sacred aspects of life as birth,
marriage, or death, it reduces them to trivia
and leaves us in a spiritual void: when law-
yersjustify our wrongdoings, they liberate us
from the feeling of guilt and invalidate the
meaning of our actions. These phenomena,
common in our everyday lives, testify to the
moral ambiguity of secular society and gener-
ate consequences we know all too well. The
role ofthe sacred, however, is ambiguous too.
Not only does it give sacral sense to funda-
mental events of life such as birth and death,
work and art, war and peace, crime and
punishment, but eilso it justifies such as-
pects of social life as, of necessity, its injus-
tices, privileges, and tools of oppression. But
the sacred cannot be contemplated inde-
pendently of the profane. When opposed to
one other, they produce a tension between
the conservative forces and the progressive
ones, between a stable structure and dy-
namic development. Without this tension,
this essence of life, the conservative forces
would lead us to death by stagnation; the
forces of change, acting in a structural void,
would cause death by disintegration.
These brief reflections on the sacred are not
intended to evoke a nostalgia for a lost world.
Rather they serve as a reminder that our
reality is more complex than some would like
to think. Today, often disappointed with our
scientific civilization, we question the institu-
tionalization of reason. We find the hegem-
ony of rationality unbearable, and we revolt
against the Utopia of progress. But perhaps
it is not the idea of progress that we should
reject but its exclusivist tendency, the wor-
ship of progress. When confronted with the
eternal, the permanent, the structured, man
may still find hope in progress.
The Postmodern World of Indifference
It is perhaps not without reason that many
concerned professionals—scientists, phi-
losophers, or artists—warn us against the
suicidal tendencies of our civilization. Their
sources can be found in science's claim to
being value free and in our loss ofhope ofever
reaching the truth. Since we are left without
any criteria for judging our thoughts and
actions it is no surprise that we escape into
nihilism and cynicism. Paradoxically, how-
ever, in spite of this bleak picture, there
flourishes a rich, theoretical and practical
activity among scientists, writers, literary
critics, artists, musicians, and architects.
Does this activity point to a more positive
aspect of our times, or is it symptomatic of
decadence? Does it represent a conscious
search, or a haphazard groping fornew objec-
tives? Within present-day architecture, so
abundantly and exquisitely documented by
the publishing industry and the media, many
trends struggle for recognition: the pastiches
of historical forms: high-tech exuberances;
consumerist extravaganzas: semiotic obscu-
rities; and poetic imagery—all compete for
publicity and supremacy. Can we define
their meaning? Unfortunately, without crite-
ria forjudging them, with no way of evaluat-
ing their significance or importance, we find
that everything seems to be equal or. to put it
differently: anything goes. But does it really?
Our common sense tells us that that is not
true, that there must be a difference between
a right approach and a wrong one. between a
good solution and a bad one. The point is that
we cannot scientifically prove what our
common sense can intuit. Consequently our
present frame of mind disregards the prob-
lem altogether. We cannot prove, for ex-
ample, that architecture which takes into
consideration the constraints of nature and
climate, the requirements of culture and
civilization, or the traditions conveyed by
history is better (or worse) than architecture
that has its roots in modem linguistics and
must (like language) find in itself its own
meaning and logic. We cannot prove that
architecture that uses the most advanced
technologies, innovative materials, and the
latest design methods is better (or worse)
than architecture that does not want to be-
come a utilitarian building trade or an exten-
sion of civil engineering but aspires to have
symbolic or artistic significance for mankind.
Should we disregard these problems as
meaningless?
All of these approaches, although well de-
fined in themselves, when considered inde-
pendently represent architecture's half-
truths. Architects approach only problems of
special interest to them, and ignore the rest.
So perhaps, to prove the superiority of any of
them would reflect a false necessity inherited
from the times of hope when we believed in
science, in truth, and desired "the obvious
and the literal." Now. in the time of disillu-
sionment, our choices are not so clear. Since
this evolution from certainty to ambiguity
seems to lead to the heart of postmodernism,
let us rephrase it. Here is how Rorty sees this
evolution in philosophy:
Up until Kant, the secular intellectual saw
the knowledge gained by the advancing natu-
ral sciences as the point of his life. Through-
out the nineteenth century, men such as
Huxley and Clifford and Peirce still saw re-
spect for scientific truth as the highest
human virtue, the moral equivalent of the
Christian's love and fear of God.
. . . But the
nineteenth century also saw the rise of a new
sort of secular intellectual, one who had lost
faith in science with the same thoroughness
as men in the Enlightenment had lost faith in
God. Carlyle and Henry Adams are examples
of this new kind of intellectual, the kind
whose consciousness is dominated by a
sense of the contingency of history, the con-
tingency of the vocabulary that he himself is
using, the sense that nature and scientific
truth are largely beside the point and that
history is for grabs. This sort of intellectual
is secular with a vengeance, for he sees the
religion of science or of humanity as being
just as self-deceptive as the old-time reli-
gion.^
But perhaps self-deception can be self-de-
ceptive too. Perhaps the present emphasis on
the ambiguity of language, the questioning of
truth, origin, and history, and consequently
the mistrust of our thoughts and actions
represent a temporary event, a symptom of
our time: to use a term so unpopular today,
the Zeitgeist. And if that is true (and to
paraphrase Nietzsche, truth will exist as long
as man believes in grammar), we are not
entitled to indulge in nihilism: to blur dis-
tinction between pluralism and chaos, ambi-
guity and obscurity, reflection and indeci-
sion, difference and indifference—to claim
that since everything deceives us. we can be
noncommittal, neutral. Neutrality does not
exist (for to be neutral means to be not not-
neutral, which means to take a position).
Hence, we need a sharpening of opinions, a
taking of stands; we need a clash of ideas,
views, and solutions without which society
would become amorphous and disintegrate
in entropy. As Kolakowski says, "human
culture cannot ever approach a perfect syn-
thesis of its diversified and incompatible
components. Its very richness is supported
by this very incompatibility of its ingredients.
And it is the conflict of values, rather than
their harmony, that keeps our culture alive."''
Yet the fragmentation of our society, the
"ambiguity of differences," the importance
given to language at the expense of the sub-
ject undermine the basis of conflicts: signifl-
ers are not worth fighting for, they do not
constitute a common ground for exchanging
arguments, reasons, or opinions. Thus the
architectural "single-interest groups" seek
satisfaction in perfecting their particular,
often arbitrary theories, in refining their
poetic imagery, in escaping into elusive alle-
gories, or just in achieving media recognition
or commercial successes. They seem to be
disinterested in the "real world" problems,
and in searching for common goals and ends.
But who determines ends, and for whom?
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A Framework for Theory in
Architecture
David Walters, RIBA
University of Oklahoma
This paper attempts to set the diffuse content
of architectural theory into a framework of
interpretation through which students may
begin to come to terms with what is often seen
as a difficult and nebulous subject. Implicit
in this framework is the belief that a particu-
larly valid role for theory is to act as an
interpretative "bridge" between an academic
subject like history and the activities of the
design studio, and in so doing act also as a
catalyst for design activity.
The paper suggests that the context of any
such discussion of theory in architecture is
provided by one of the most fundamental of
all artistic concerns—the dialectic between
reality and its representation. The concept of
the dialectic is used here in the Hegelian
sense of a pairing of a thesis and its antithe-
sis. This provides the mechanism by which
structure and form are given to the argu-
ments contained in the paper, which outlines
a series of four dialectic constructions, each
dealing with a different aspect of architec-
tural inquiry. These dialectics form a series
of overlays which together can provide the
basis of a framework of interpretation and
analysis, and which comprise the material of
a subsequent lecture course.
These four dialectics are posed at the phe-
nomenal level by considering issues of con-
stancy and change in the physical world; at
the philosophical level by discussing some
essential attributes of rationalism and em-
piricism as they affect architecture; at the
attitudinal level by examining the aesthetic
and social values evident in the opposing
artistic styles and viewpoints of classicism
and romanticism; and, fmally, at the opera-
tional level by analyzing the concepts of sjoi-
tactic and semantic structure as they are
relevant to architectural design. These argu-
ments are discussed and exemplified with
reference to the work of various architects,
historical and contemporary.
To begin with we need to acknowledge that
the word "theory" has various meanings: it
may, for example, be contrasted with practice
as unverified speculation; or it may be used
to signify any hypothesis whether confirmed
or not; but in its best sense it signifies a
systematic account ofsome particular field of
study derived from a set of general proposi-
tions. These may be taken as postulates
—
that is, propositions assumed to be true and
thus not requiring any further "proof—or
they may be principles more or less strongly
confirmed by experience, as in the natural
sciences. There may be rival theories in a
particular field, differing in their selection of
principles, or in the emphasis laid upon
certain principles or propositions.
This last condition characterizes theory in
architecture, for our discipline contains
many rival and often mutually exclusive
theories. Geoffrey Scott, writing in 1914,
expressed this state of affairs as it struck him
forcibly;
Architecture, it is said, must be "expressive of
its purpose," or "expressive of its true con-
struction," or "expressive of the materials it
employs" or "expressive of the national life"
(whether noble or otherwise), or "expressive
ofa noble life" (whether national or not) ; or ex-
pressive of the craftsman's temperament, or
the owner's or the architect's, or, on the
contrary, "academic" and studiously indiffer-
ent to these factors. It must, we are told, be
symmetrical, or it must be picturesque—that
is, above all things, unsymmetrical. It must
be "traditional" and "scholarly," that is, re-
sembling what has already been done by
Greek, Roman, Medieval, or Georgian archi-
tects, or it must be "original" and "spontane-
ous," that is, it must be at pains to avoid this
resemblance; or it must strike some happy
compromise between these opposites: and so
forth indefinitely.
with the manipulation of quantifiable physi-
cal phenomena such as heat, light, and
sound are guided and informed by what we
might call "scientific" theory, based on em-
pirical experiment, observation, and reason-
ing. Structural theory in building operates in
the same way, a way where theories having to
do with quantifiable conditions may be util-
ized in order to predict the outcome of par-
ticular circumstances and design decisions.
So we can begin to see that there are different
types of knowledge within the discipline of
architecture. These different components of
architectural knowledge can be conveniently
classified as:
If these axioms were frankly untrue, they
would be easy to dismiss; if they were based
on fully reasoned theories, they would be
easy, at any rate, to discuss. They are nei-
ther. We have few "fully reasoned" theories.
. . . We subsist on a number of architectural
habits, on scraps of tradition, on caprices
and prejudices, and above all on this mass of
more or less spacious axioms, of half-truths,
unrelated, uncriticized and often contradic-
tory, by means of which there is no building
so bad that it cannot with a little ingenuity be
justified, or so good that it cannot be plausi-
bly condemned.'
i) empirical knowledge about build-
ings; in particular, construction and
technology—essentially, how to
build;
ii) knowledge ofthe technique and craft
of design: the design process—how
to design:
iii) knowledge of the art of architecture;
why a building looks the way it does;
how the form of the building relates
to the generating sets of ideas; what
the origin and content of such ideas
may be; and how these ideas relate to
wider ideological or philosophical
So we can sense that by and large, in its very
nature, architectural theory proceeds on the
basis ofpostulates, propositions, that are not
susceptible to any form of "proof in the
scientific sense. But this is not totally true.
Those aspects of architecture having to do
This paper sets itself principally within the
third category, although all three of the
components interrelate in complex ways.
Indeed, just as we begin to appreciate the
complexities of what we do. so do we realize
that to attempt to operate in terms ofjust our
own personal and individual experience of
buildings is insufficient to engage this com-
plexity effectively. Descriptions of perceived
relationships at a direct and "surface" level
are important, but they are not enough.
Analytical and Intellectual examination at a
deeper level is also required, and for such a
level of inquiry to operate effectively we need
the formulation of some coherent framework
ofvalues and propositions concerning archi-
tecture. Such propositions would transcend
the immediate realm of purely personal expe-
rience and establish a more profound basis of
reasoned criteria and relationships. It is the
examination of these deeper levels of value,
relationships, and intentions that constitute
theory In architecture.
The development of some form of reasoned
critical framework provides us with a set of
tools with which to manipulate complex
ideas, and it allows us to Inform and enrich
our design intentions. The need for clearly
defined Intentions In our work is relevant for
at least two major reasons. The first, as
suggested above. Is that such a framework of
values and references, with some breadth
and depth ofintellectual content, can directly
benefit us as designers. It can be more
comprehensive, supportive, and stimulating
than merely an expression of personal belief.
Such a framework can connect our contem-
porary design actions into the continuum of
history, and it incorporates societal criteria
into its frame of reference. The second rea-
son, really a specific instance of the first, is a
concern for reducing the gap in understand-
ing between ourselves and our work on the
one hand, and the general public on the
other. In recent and present times many
architects have seemed to settle for a beliefin
developing what may be called a personal
philosophy, as a substitute for a workable
and informative theoretical base.^ The prob-
lem with this approach is that if those beliefs
are simply personal to us as individuals, and
not easily expressed in terms that are gener-
ally understood by the rest of society—our
patrons and users ofour buildings—then the
only justification available to us in respond-
ing to criticism is that of maintaining the
position of an autonomous artist. This
means, in effect, that our work subscribes
not so much to general principles as to just
our own belief in its value. Thus without any
bridge of explanation and sharing of values
with society, any rapprochement between
ourselves, as artists and design profession-
als, and our public may prove to be impos-
sible. Paul Klee, remember, during the
Bauhaus period, complained that "the people
are not with us," and felt this loss keenly as
a diminution of the artist's role within soci-
ety.
But before we can begin to consider what any
such "general principles" might be, we need
to define and discuss what we may call the
"content" of architectural theory, that is,
what sort of ideas constitute theory in archi-
tecture, what do they mean, and where do
they come from? The critical framework for
the discussion offered in this paper is predi-
cated upon a series of dialectic propositions,
a series of pairing of ideas and attitudes that
ostensibly are polarized, and as such serve to
indicate opposite ends of the architectural
spectrum. The catalyst for these discussions
is provided by what is perhaps one ofthe most
fundamental of all dialectics within art, that
between reality and the representation of
that reality through any particular artistic
medium. In our case, of course, the medium
is architecture, which, being a "useful" art,
has to embrace both the real and the repre-
sentational; the work ofarchitecture is part of
the real, usable world as well as being a
representation of it.
But what actually does this mean, when we
talk about architecture being a representa-
tion of reality? Architecture is produced
(usually) in response to a program or a par-
ticular set of needs, and such needs or pro-
grams embody individual, social, political,
and technological ideas and values, either
implicitly or explicitly. These form the imme-
diate reality of the building condition, and at
the same time are part of a greater cultural
reality beyond the specific case. These ideas
and values are indeed phenomena that con-
tribute to the shaping of our world, physi-
cally and metaphorically; and architecture,
as forms and spaces conceived and built in
response to these values and conditions.
"represents" them to us in physical form. We
are able to "read" meanings in buildings;
ideas and values are represented and made
visible to our understanding. We under-
stand, of course, that when we talk like this
about architecture being representational,
we are not talking about some simple picto-
rial representation of likeness. Architecture
is not an imitative art in this literal sense. For
architecture to represent something there
has to involve some form of symbolism, or
some form of signification whereby one thing,
a building or a part of a building, stands for
or reminds us ofanother thing or idea. In this
sense, architecture can be considered a
medium of social communication, and we
can begin to sense that it contains within
itself concepts and values that are indicative
of two manifestly distinct conditions. On the
one hand there are clearly forms, ideas, and
values that are the substance of architecture
itself, its own history, traditions, and profes-
sional discipline. We may think ofsuch ideas
as being "internally referential." On the other
hand, we can see that in order to signify other
non-architectural meanings in relation to its
societal context, architecture has to deal with
ideas and values that are connected to these
issues: that is, they are "externally referen-
tial."
We will return in due course to these impor-
tant notions ofarchitecture as social commu-
nication and of internal and external refer-
ence, but before doing so, in relation to the
issue of representation, let us first consider
what we mean when we talk as artists about
"reality."
It is a resonable generalization to say that the
various artistic revolutions of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries aimed, each in
its own way, at the idea of a more "essential"
realism.^ There was a discernible intention to
penetrate beneath superficial appearances
and stylistic techniques, to move beyond
convention in a search for ways to achieve a
more profound understanding of contempo-
rary reality. To do this, art made "analogues"
of reality; that is, it focused upon some par-
ticular ideas and phenomena and created
new kinds of visual structures, through
which, by comparison with pragmatic experi-
ence, certain attributes of reality could be
better understood and appreciated. A clear
example of such intentions is provided by the
artists of the cubist movement in the early
years of this century in their attempt to
engage the dimension of time as something
fundamental to any portrayal of reality. As
we know, this led them to the concept of sim-
ultanaeity with its representational develop-
ment of the depiction, all together, of several
aspects of the same object, which in "real"
time would have to be experienced sequen-
tially. The purism of Le Corbusier and Oz-
enfant also demonstrates this idea of ana-
logues of reality in the way that ideas con-
cerning the fundamental structure of the
world are suggested and depicted by vari-
ations upon only a few "universal" forms and
archetypal objects.
A necessary corollary to the creation of ana-
logues in this sense is the generation of
aesthetic rule systems and paradigms to
guide and sustain the artistic endeavor. Piet
Mondrian's paintings ofthe 1920s and 1930s
provide an example ofsuch a rule system and
its operation and refinement, while Le Cor-
busier's "Five Points" became a clear para-
digm for the International Style. Now, ifthese
paradigms and rule systems are conceme^^
with some notion of "essential" ideas and
attributes of reality (as they attempted to be)
then we could reasonably expect them to deal
with conditions and qualities that are abso-
lute and unchanging. But, in our thinking
upon this, we have to acknowledge that it is
not a simple matter to define "absolute" and
unchanging conditions. Here, then, we are
required to confront the first of the dialectic
structures with which we may construct our
theoretical framework, that is, the dialectic
between constancy and change in the phe-
nomena that comprise our world.
Throughout the classical world, and during
the Renaissance, the concept of art was pri-
marily based upon the notion of some exem-
plary past that contained absolute values of
beauty. The essence lay in the classical ideal,
and it was firmly believed that "the task of art
was to imitate nature, and that in fact artistic
excellence lay in masterly and proper imita-
tion of nature,"** Against this classical theory
of mimesis, the great German philosopher
Hegel ( 1 770- 1 83 1 ) proposed that art be lifted
out of this abstract metaphysical realm and
be located instead within the "concrete"
world of each particular culture. Each cul-
tural period was now to be viewed as a
recognizable and discrete stage in an evolu-
tionary process of history, each stage recog-
nizable in relation to its social attitudes and
aesthetic forms. Thus, here we have the
notion of relativity; social values, ideologies,
and aesthetic principles are relative to their
period and not absolute across time. We can
clearly perceive here ideas of relative and
absolute beauty coming from philosophical
inquiry, and connecting directly to our dia-
lectic of constancy and change, and it is into
the realms of philosophy that we need to
venture now in order to better understand
these origins and connections.
Aristotelian thought offers particular insight
into the problem ofconstancy and change, for
according to Aristotle's analysis we have to
recognize two basic elements in any possible
natural event. The first of these is that there
must be something that remains the same,
and yet is somehow subject to variation: and
the other is that there do occur genuine
changes of qualities. Thus, for example,
when an acom grows into an oak tree, there
must be some permanent feature that has at
one time the qualities that we call an acom,
and later, those that we call an oak. Unless
this were the case, we could not even properly
describe it as a change, since there would be
no relation between the former stage and the
latter. But if there is some fixed aspect, there
must be another that changes; there must be
something different between the acom and
the oak or there would be no genuine altera-
tion. The two features, Aristotle said, are
matter and form. Matter is the essential
characteristic which is capable of being "in-
formed," that is, of assuming various forms.
The matter of the acom and the oak has the
potential to receive different forms, of having
one form at one time and another form at a
later time. The form of the object at any given
time is its actuality, what it has become at
that particular moment.
a permanent nature which persists through
its realization or acquisition of different
forms. Each and every object can be under-
stood only in terms of both its matter and its
form, and the processes by which it grows,
alters, or moves, that is, replaces one form
with another. The permanent aspect of an
object never exists independently, or without
assuming some form; the object always is in
some state and in the process of reaching
some other state. Thus the formal changing
aspect, and the material, permanent aspect
of any object are always present and always
constitute the basis for any explanation of
what is occurring.
This has clear and direct implications for
architecture inasmuch as it suggests that the
design of a building is intrinsically the proc-
ess through which we may identify and pre-
serve some essences of the physical and
societal context, while at the same time being
the agent of transformation of these essential
qualities so that they may be continually re-
presented in ways relevant and particular to
contemporary circumstances. The work of
Giancarlo de Carlo in Urbino, Italy, is specifi-
cally instructive in this regard. For example,
his School of Education set within the urban
fabric of the medieval city demonstrates di-
rect conceptual connections both to its
physical context and to architectural ideas
evident in the nearby fourteenth-century
Ducal Palace (by Laurana and Francesco di
Giorgio); and yet the form of de Carlo's build-
ing is unmistakably contemporary, and its
vocabulary that of the modem movement.
Our excursion into metaphysical philosophy
in fact brings us to the second element in our
developing theoretical framework, and this
concerns nothing less than the fundamental
question, how do we define this "reality" that
we are engaged in representing? This is such
a profound topic that we clearly need some
acceptable level of generalization for our
purposes, and indeed we can define such a
level of inquiry by phrasing our second dia-
lectic as that between the philosophical poles
of rationalism and empiricism.
Each and every object in this world thus has Rationalism is a philosophy that goes back in
its architectural manifestations to at least
the eighteenth century, when it provided the
theoretical basis for architecture in France
and Italy, in contrast to the Picturesque
developments in England, which were predi-
cated upon the alternate philosophy of em-
piricism.
As with all profound questions of philosophy,
origins can be found in the work of such
classical giants as Plato and Aristotle, but for
our purposes rationalism as a philosophical
position was most clearly formulated by the
Frenchman Rene Descartes in 1637. He was
concerned to arrive at a distillation of con-
cepts that were absolute and "true" in any
and all circumstances, that Is. deep and
underlying elemental phenomena that were
constant and irreducible whatever the vari-
ety of superficial circumstances of any situ-
ation. To this end he rejected any knowledge
gained through the senses as untrustworthy
and subject to change, and he concentrated
instead upon absolute and abstract deduc-
tive reasoning. For example, he maintained,
he could not know if at any one time he was
sitting in his study reading a book, or lying
asleep dreaming about it.^ There was no
absolute proof of the condition. But whether
he was asleep or awake his hand would still
have five fingers; the number "five" was there-
fore "true." And what was true ofnumber was
also true of form—of the square, the triangle,
the cube, the cone, the sphere, and the
cylinder; these were profound realities that
existed as elemental phenomena, and which
underlay the whole series of transient and
ephemeral "realities" experienced through
our senses. There is, or course, much more
to Cartesian rationalism than this simplistic
summary, but this was the part that subse-
quent architectural theorists saw as rele-
vant.
Marc-Antoine Laugier in 1753 translated
these ideas into architectural form through
his mj^hical Primitive Hut,'' where he postu-
lated that all great architecture was and
should be developed from only three basic
formal elements: the column, the pediment,
and the architrave. This basic trilogy of
forms, he considered, was the irreducible
essence of architectural form; it encapsu-
lated universal architectural truths, valid at
all times and in all places, and it was given
authority by the antiquity and origin of these
forms in the mythical past, when the first
buildings were supposed to have been con-
structed using only these three elements.
Nearer to our own time Mies van der Rohe
brought this rationalist tradition to the fur-
thest limits of abstraction by building in
twentieth-century materials pure examples
of what Laugier had written about. Indeed,
Mies's famous dictum of "less is more" is as
terse a representation of rationalist philoso-
phy in architecture as we are likely to see.
Current work in Europe by the so-called
neorationalists such as Aldo Rossi, Giorgio
Grassi, and O. M. Lingers also pursues these
and similar themes.
In contrast to this rationalist position, the
philosophy of empiricism, as developed by
British philosophers such as Bacon, Locke,
Hume, and Berkeley in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, takes a thoroughly
opposite stance. It says that far from mis-
trusting our senses, as Descartes did. they
are indeed our only source of knowledge.^ We
are, so these philosophers considered, bom
with a totally blank mind, "white paper" onto
which we record the impressions received bjj
our eyes, ears, and other sensory organs,
thus building up in the only possible way our
knowledge ofthe world outside ourselves. We
submit these sensory perceptions, as we
receive them, to various ordering procedures,
comparing, contrasting, and thus learning
relationships between people, things, con-
cepts, and so forth. Rather than considering
some general set ofcircumstances and work-
ing downward and inward toward some irre-
ducible and universal essence by a process of
deductive logic, as the rationalist would, the
empiricist tends to begin with some particular
circumstances, and from a detailed examina-
tion of this to work upward and outward
toward some generalized conclusions by the
opposite process of inductive logic.
This approach to philosophy also has pro-
found implications for architecture. In the
eighteenth century, for example, designers
such as Humphrey Repton took these ideals
and culled from them a set of precepts by
which designs could be made for the express
purpose of sensory delight. Indeed, a major
impetus of the eighteenth-century Pictur-
esque movement, and to a large extent the
nineteenth-century romantic movement
also, was derived from the idea of the direct
appeal to the senses—to specifically induce
in the spectator certain emotions generated
by the arrangement offorms and images. Nor
do we need to look back into history for other
examples. A designer like Charles Moore is a
pure empiricist, concerned above all else with
human sensory comfort and delight. This is
shown particularly well in Moore's design of
a house for a blind client and his family near
NewYork. Here the whole plan is ordered and
informed by utilization of a whole range of
sensory experiences, with a particular com-
bination of a stimuli provided by each space,
so that the sightless person can orient him-
self, move around and enjoy the house by
experiencing it and learning the arrangement
ofspaces from the sensations given to him by
each space. Such sensations are provided by
touch—the feel of different materials; by
sound—^with different acoustic resonances
from surfaces, and the use of water in the
central space as a sound source to assist
direction finding: by heat—with sunlight
admitted to rooms at particular times and in
particular ways depending on the use of the
room and its orientation; by smell -with
internal landscape used to provide a range of
olfactory experiences for different spaces,
and so forth. The ordering geometry of form
and space is here not derived from idealized
forms and relationships, but rather from an
assemblage of particular incidents which are
then correlated into an overall formal compo-
sition.
So far we have defined two dialectic struc-
tures within the overall frame of artistic
endeavor concerning reality and its represen-
tation. The first highlighted the ever-present
phenomenal relationship between constancy
and change, while the second considered the
philosophical relationship between rational-
ist and empiricist positions. To this develop-
ing framework we can add two further dialec-
tic constructs, an attitudinal relationship
between classicism and romanticism, and an
operational relationship between syntactic
and semantic structures within architectural
form. What we are engaged in doing here is
building our framework of theory by a proc-
ess of continual focusing on the "grain" of
architectural ideas; from overall issues per-
taining to the patterns and processes that
constitute our world of complex phenomena;
through philosophical polarities that each in
their own way seek to manage these complex
issues; down to aesthetic attitudes that refine
our judgment; and finally to a discussion of
how architecture actually operates as a for-
mal system and a medium ofcommunication
for ideas and values.
In relation to aesthetic attitudes, the distinc-
tion between classicism and romanticism is a
useful one inasmuch as it distinguishes be-
tween particular and powerful groupings of
aesthetic and social values. We can say
again, within the limits of acceptable gener-
alization, that classicism is social, formal,
intellectual, logically organized, and static;
and romanticism is individual, informal,
emotional, and dynamic.® Classicism is
social in that its emphasis is on the qualities
that people. Institutions, and other societal
groupings have in common, rather than on
individual differences. This emphasis on
similarities inevitably imparts a degree of
conformity to classical works, manifested in
a certain amount of formality and predeter-
mined standards, polish, and accepted con-
ventions, together with an overall objectivity,
as opposed to the essential subjectivity of the
romantic point of view. There is with the
classical viewpoint a general desire to have
fixed standards and to be able to conform to
them with the certainty of being right. In the
seventeenth century, for example, in the field
of literature, the foundation of the academies
in France was motiviated by the declared
intention "to give our language certainty by
rules . . . and to make it pure (and) eloquent."^
This desire for a system of rules that would
guarantee correctness and quality received
great reinforcement from Newtonian physics
and mathematics in the late seventeenth
century, which revealed that the whole uni-
verse was rational, systematic, and consis-
tent, operating by its "laws" with mathemati-
cal precision.
The use of the word "rational" points up some
cross-references between classicism and
rationalism, just as a different emphasis, this
time on the individual and his senses, implies
some connections between romanticism and
empiricism. It is important, however, to
continue to distinguish rationalism and
empiricism as basic philosophical positions
concerning the theory of knowledge—how we
interpret what we know—whereas classicism
and romanticism remain primarily as oppos-
ing attitudes or styles, with commonalities
within themselves across the arts and into
the philosophy of aesthetics.
transcendent ideas of universal beauty and
value, and guarantees a degree of aesthetic
good manners at the very least, but it can also
breed a deadening conservatism that is sti-
fling to innovation and the individual. That
these are powerful aesthetic impulses cannot
be doubted, and one of the reasons for the
renewed popularity and recognition of the
works of Karl Friedrich Schinkel ( 1 78 1 - 1 844)
is nothing less than this architect's unique
ability to weave together nineteenth-century
sources of romanticism and neoclassicism to
create a powerful and flexible architectural
language.
We can recognize that attitudes inherent in
classical thought represent one aspect of
architectural inquiry that is always present
—
the search for stable and solid criteria— and
against this we can recognize also that atti-
tude characterized by the independently
minded artists of the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries. These artists and architects
refused to be drawn into the world of the
academies and the great bodies of estab-
lished thought and doctrine: they preferred
instead to search independently and indi-
vidually for an appropriate expression of
their contemporary epoch. Instead of trying
to develop an objective and considered re-
sponse to any given situation, the romantic
artist or architect preferred instead to em-
phasize his own individual reaction to the
circumstances, to celebrate the idea of
unique personalities. Jean Jacques
Rousseau, the eighteenth-century French
philosopher, provided a statement that might
well serve as the rallying call for the whole
romantic movement when he wrote: "1 am not
made like anyone I have seen: 1 dare believe
that 1 am not made like anyone in existence.
If 1 am not better, at least 1 am different."'"
In moving onto our final dialectic construct,
that between syntactic and semantic struc-
ture, we are dealing now specifically with the
operational end of architectural theory, and
attempting to explain something of the na-
ture of architecture as a formal language.
Having come to some conclusions about the
content and concepts of reality, and our
attitudes toward them, we are now able to
consider those means that we have at our
disposal, as architects, to effect some repre-
sentation of this reality.
We talked earlier in the essay about architec-
ture being "representational," not in an^
simple pictorial sense, but rather as a system
of social communication involving some form
of symbolism or other means of signification.
In this sense architecture, as a means of
social communication, can be considered as
a sign system or language, and thus is sus-
ceptible, to some degree, to basic linguistic
analysis. This consideration of architecture
as a sign system allows us to borrow from
linguistic studies the key concepts of seman-
tic and syntactic structure, which together
form the final element in our dialectic series.
We can see, then, in brief summary of this
element of our theory framework, that ro-
mantic and classical attitudes each present
certain strengths and weaknesses. The ro-
mantic celebration of unique personalities is
a catalyst to individual insight and innova-
tion, but it can also lead to an unfettered
anarchy where there are not rules or com-
munally agreed values. Conformity to classi-
cal canon can put the artist in touch with
To explain simply this categorization we can
say that semantics deals with the study ofthe
ways in which signs actually carry meaning,
and how such meaning is communicated.
Syntactics, on the other hand, deals with the
rules and processes of combination of signs,
without regard for the content or meaning of
the signs: for example the ways in which
words may be combined into sentences ac-
cording to certain rules but without specific
reference to the meaning of the words them-
selves.
In developing our understanding of syntac-
tics in architectural terms we can see that we
are considering rules ofcombination that are
"abstract" in the sense that they are devoid of
any representational meaning. But their
logic as systems of elements and combina-
tions has to derive from some source, and this
source is the discipline of architecture itself,
its traditions, history, aesthetic and con-
structional rule systems, paradigms, and so
forth. We can say, in fact, that as such,
syntactic structures are "internally referen-
tial" in the manner that we noted earlier.
One of the clearest examples of the develop-
ment of an approach to architectural design
that establishes its coherence and logic from
writhin the limits of its own discipline was
formulated by the French architect J. N. L.
Durand in his lectures to the Ecole Polytech-
nlque in Paris during the early years of the
nineteenth century. ' ' Durand defined archi-
tecture simply as the art of composing and
executing buildings, and he argued that
because architecture was the most expensive
of all the arts It should not be whimsical or
guided by prejudice. Durand argued that in
order to avoid wasteful expense, architec-
tural design had to closely follow totally ra-
tional and immutable rules, and In contrast
to previous theoretical positions (such as
Laugier's Primitive Hut) he stressed the ir-
relevance ofany transcendental justification.
Architecture, he maintained, should be as-
sured of its usefulness in a material world
ruled by pragmatic values, and there was no
need to look for any explanations outside the
field of this new and completely autonomous
theory, composed now of truths evident from
mathematical reason. Architecture, created
by people for people, could identify and reach
its objectives "within Its own way of being."
Although clearly aligned with contemporary
rational philosophical notions, Durand's
theory was predicated upon a system of val-
ues markedly different from those of his
predecessors. Values in architecture were
no longer to be identified by a set of precepts
explained and justified by transcendental
intentions and relationships. Architecture
ceased with Durand to be a metaphoric image
of some aspects of cosmic order, where sym-
bolism had been an inherent component in
architectural thinking. The new self-con-
tained and pragmatic order contained similar
sets of forms, but their relationships were
now self-referential and autonomous, and
their ordering was rational, not symbolic.
Durand's process was based upon the logical
premises of analysis and synthesis. He
analyzed the elements ofbuildings, columns,
walls, openings, roofs, vaults, and so forth,
relating form to material and construction.
He then explained how to combine these
elements, which he compared to words in a
language, or notes in music, and through
these combinations the separate parts of the
buildings were formed, such as rooms, porti-
coes, and atriums. Once these parts were
well formulated, Durand explained how to
compose whole structures, and In such a
manner architectural design became a for-
mal game of combinations, devoid of any
transcendental justifications. Any meanings
were to be derived from within the system,
and architecture became a language where
any possible meanings depended entirely on
syntax. Form and content had become one.
The influence of Durand's theory upon nine-
teenth- and twentieth-century architecture
has been Immense. His teaching methods
and precepts became enshrined in education
and practice alike; at the ecoles of the nine-
teenth century and at the schools of architec-
ture in the twentieth century this method and
theory formed the basis ofmuch of the archi-
tect's training. Book such as Nathaniel
Curtis's Architectural Composition in the
1920s and 1930s were the backbone of stu-
dio Instruction and comprised largely of
reworkings and refinements of Durand's
teachings. And today, a book like Chlng's
Architecture: Form. Space and Order follows
very closely the explicit and implicit mes-
sages of Durand's Lecons d'Architecture,
published in 1802, in the way that it demon-
strates clear themes of syntactic composi-
tion, such as spatial ordering systems, for-
mal typologies, and so forth. These themes
are validated and interpreted within their
40
owTi terms of reference and the provenance of
architectural tradition and precendent.
The whole subject of syntactics received a
tremendous boost in the 1950s after Noam
Chomsky first published his book Syntactic
Structures. '^ Chomsky suggested that we are
able to express ourselves and our ideas by
forming sentences according to certain "gen-
erative" and "transforming" rules of syntax,
and his book contains many examples of
language form generation according to these
complex rules. Some architects, notably
Peter Eisenman. have tried to make direct
analogies with Chomsky's rule systems in
order to develop aesthetic rule systems for
the generation and transformation of archi-
tectural form. Eisenman's "House" series is
perhaps the most notable recent example of
an architect attempting to construct an
architecture from completely syntactical
sources, or as Durand put it, from "within its
own way of being."
In acknowledging the importance and preva-
lence of architectural inquiry at the syntactic
pole of our dialectic, we have to give parallel
and equal consideration to operations within
the field of semantics, that is, the study of
how signs carry meaning. The most promis-
ing way of looking at this area of study seems
to be through the theory of signs developed
from the work of Ferdinand de Saussure, a
Swiss linguist and philosopher who re-
searched the subject at the University of
Geneva between 1 906 and 1911.''' Saussure
called his general theory of signification
"semiology," and it has at its root the basic
idea that a sign is a two-part entity, the form
which signifies an idea, and the idea that is
signified. We may be surprised to find this,
Saussure's most basic concept, anticipated
by none other than Vitruvlus, who wrote "in
all matters, but particularly architecture,
there are those two points; the thing signified
and that which gives it significance."'^
Saussure's distinction between the signifler
and the signified is exactly like this. The
signifler consists of some material represen-
tation, a word, or some part of a building, for
example, while the signified is that concept to
which the representation refers. However, in
order for the meanings to be understood a
third element must be present—what we may
call a "social contract." This social contract is
the mechanism by which meanings are
shared and respected. For example, there
was no particular reason why the English
should call a certain animal "bull," but there
now exists a social contract between all
English-speaking peoples in the world that
we shall use the word "bull" when we want to
refer to that particular type of animal. If, for
example, I used some other word or coined a
new word for the purpose, no one could
understand me: 1 would have broken the
social contract. It is important, however, to
recognize at this point that architecture is not
quite like written or spoken language in this
respect. Although we can see from examples
that architecture clearly does carry mean-
ings, there is no comprehensive social con-
tract as to what the meanings of building
elements or whole buildings are. What social
contract that does exist as to meanings and
architectural form is a partial and patchy
one. As an example of this "architectural
contract" in operation we can cite the ex-
ample of the Gothic cathedral, and note that
this building type is a communally under-
stood and potent "signifier" of the Christian
faith, that which is "signified," Indeed,
through a process of learning this relation-,
ship most of us in Western cultures now
share a social contract as to conventional
church form. However, such a learned and
shared relationship does not exist across the
spectrum of architecture: architectural ele-
ments are not simply like words in this re-
spect, and we need to exercise great caution
in expecting or demanding neat or "pack-
aged" meanings from architectural form.
Despite this valid warning, however, it is
constructive to look at an example of a build-
ing that is specifically encoded with mean-
ings in order to understand better the poten-
tial of this relationship between form and
meaning. In this context both Geoffrey
Broadbent'^ and Charles Jencks"^ have
drawn attention to the Casa Batllo ofAntonio
Gaudi in Barcelona ( 1 904-6) as an example of
an architecture that carries a rich variety of
meanings at a number of levels of interpreta-
tion. The first two floors have an unusual
colonnade which has a strong visual analogy
with human bones. The main facade with its
undulating forms in brown, green, and blue
ceramics "represents" the sea. while the
boldly tiled roofactually "looks like" a dragon,
and the whole arrangement is topped by a
pinnacle bearing a Christian cross. Bones,
sea. and dragon are all represented by simple
visual analogy, but Jencks has pointed out
also that the whole composition is given extra
relevance and depth of meaning in that it
operates also as an expression of national
pride for the Spanish province ofCatalonia, of
which Barcelona is the capital. Here we have
a representation of Catalonian separatism in
the symbolic slaying of the dragon of Castile
(the seat of central authority in sixteenth-
and seventeenth-century Spain) by St.
George, the patron saint of Barcelona. St.
George is signified by the Christian cross, the
"bones" signify the bones of the martyrs who
died during the course of the conflict, while
the "sea" may signify the general maritime
nature of that area of northeast Spain and
Barcelona in particular. Here we have a
social contract for these deeper levels of
meaning which is common to only one par-
ticular group, those sharing the communal
heritage of the Catalonian province. The
building may be. for this social group, a very
potent and enjoyable symbol, but it is impor-
tant for us to realize also that the very limited
nature ofthis social contract does not take all
value from the building even if we are ex-
cluded from this specific history and heri-
tage. The architectural form still retains
beauty and visual coherence, and contains
within it other, more simple and direct visual
analogies that may be appreciated by the
casual observer. This consistency and coher-
ence is achieved across these various levels
precisely because there is a dialogue between
the syntactic structure of formal composition
and the semantic structures of analogy and
cultural meaning.
internally referential within their own disci-
pline and those that are externally referential
to other societal or artistic values is an impor-
tant one, and a distinction that would serve
to underwrite a series offurther explorations.
This paper, then, has sufficed only to scratch
the surface of many important matters, an
examination of which may help us under-
stand both the products and processes ofour
own discipline and also to inform the design
intentions that guide our work as practicing
architects. At the same time the themes,
topics, and architectural works discussed
briefly here serve to define the content of a
lecture course designed to orient students in
the complex and often contradictory world of
architectural theory.
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other place (s):
An Examination of "place" in the Work of
Aalto and Terragni
Brian L. McLaren
Washington University
place as space
Place, (pie's), sb. Forms: |ME. place. a.F.
place (11th c.)=Pr. plassa, Sp. plaza. Pg.
praca. It. piazza.... Placehas superseded OE.
stOLt) and (largely ) stede; it answers to F. lieu,
L. locus, as well as to F. place, and the senses
are thus very numerous and difficult to ar-
range.
I. 1. An open space In a city; a square, a mar-
ket-place, a. Used in OE. to render L. platea
of the Vulgate.
II. A material space.
2. space; extension in two (or three) direc-
tions; 'room.' arch. To offer place, to make
way, give way (ohs.).
3. A particular part of a space, of defined or
undefined extent, but of definite situation.
(=L. locus. OE. stow.) Sometimes applied to
a region or part of the earth's surface.'
In attempting to understand the concept of
place, we fluctuate between thinking of place
as a physical thing and considering place as
an experiential phenomenon. This vacilla-
tion is reflected in other efforts to define
place, for example. Christian Norberg-
Schulz's in Genius Loci. Inspired by Martin
Heidegger's concept of 'dwelling,'^ Norberg-
Schulz accurately observes that place cannot
be reduced to any one of its properties, such
as space or dimension, without losing what is
described as its concrete nature. With the
use of phenomenology, a return to "things"
rather than mental constructions, Norberg-
Schulz asserts that "place" is found in our
ability to concretize our existence in form.
His term "concrete space" is described not as
homogeneous, but as growing out ofits many
qualities such as enclosure and extension,
and their specific material expression.
However, it is in Norberg-Schulz's discussion
of its concrete nature that the phenomenon of
place reverts back to the physical forms
which signify it, rather than staying within
the play of this signification. He uses the
etymological meaning of the word to reinforce
the idea that "place" as a noun is a phenome-
non that exists in the physical environment.
He goes on to connect "place" with its quali-
ties of space and its attendant character,
terms which he subsequently uses to discuss
the spirit of place of various cities.
In this discussion it seems that, although
place and space are not synonymous, the
former is deemed necessary for a reading of
place, especially within an urban context.
This contrasts with other commentators
such as Alan Colquhoun, who recognizes the
separation between the physical environ-
ment as a social schematization and our
reading of it.^
Place, for Norberg-Schulz, is connected with
the notion of belonging, and is expressed
through the act of symbolizing meanings
within a conventional spatial tradition.
However, it is my contention that, just as in
Gaston Bachelard's writings,^ where the
"space" lies outside the text, "place" resides in
the associations and meanings that exist
outside of the physical environment. It is
through the signification, through the reso-
nances that arise out of a reading of concrete
space, that one can begin to understand
"place."
the other
Place (pie's), u. Pa.t. and pple. placed (ple'st):
also 6 Sc. plasit, plaist, pladeit, 6-7 plast(e;
pa.pple. 6 yplasde. [f. Place sb. So F. placer
(1606 In Hatz.-Darm.).]
1. trans. To put or set in a particular place,
position, situation; to station: to posit: Jig. to
set in some condition or relation to other
things. Often a mere synonym of put, set.^
In the final chapter of his book, Norberg-
Schulz criticizes the modem movement for its
lack of spatial definition. He uses the ideas of
space and character as a means to reveal
what he considers to be its lack of imageabil-
ity and the resultant loss of place in the
contemporary city. He specifically cites the
lack of figure-ground relationship as a symp-
ton of this malaise, while still maintaining
that certain architects, such as Wright and Le
Corbusier, achieve a measure of spatial defi-
nition in their work. However, rather than
assume that these works represent a disinte-
gration of spatial qualities, it may be more
productive to propose that modem architec-
ture represents a condition where space is
not a priort that this is a different kind of
"space" that we are seeing.
originally a hierarchical system ofspaces (the
sacred, the profane), which he calls the space
of localization. This space gave way to the
space of extension, which he connects with
Galileo's discovery of the earth's movement
around the sun. Foucault then connects the
space ofour time with the concept of arrange-
ment, an idea which comes from the systems
and networks of modem technology. He
concludes that the space ofarrangement can
be described as a series of relationships be-
tween positions that separate them and link
them to create a kind of shape. It is a space
that is not neutral or homogeneous, but one
which is saturated with specific qualities, like
the poetic "space" described by Bachelard.
This paper will attempt to uncover these
other "places," ones that cannot be codified
with the figure-ground dichotomy to which
traditional conceptions of space seembound.
This investigation is grounded in two basic
precepts: the first, that if the structure of
language informs the analysis of place, and if
architecture is indeed a text, then the idea of
place resides in the reading of that text and
the play ofassociations between each "word."
Secondly, the critical analysis of these proj-
ects will be undertaken in relation to the idea
of arrangement, as it represents a condition
in which "place" emerges as the qualities of
relationships between positions.
Michel Foucault, in his article "Autres Es-
paces,"'' describes this "space" in relation to
the changes in spatial conceptions that
Western history reveals. He briefly outlines
this progression by stating that there was
place(s) of difference
"Traveling, you realize that differences are
lost: each city takes to resembling all cities,
places exchange theirform, order, distances.
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Figure I. Alvar Aalto, Town Hall. Saynatsalo.
1952. view of courtyard (photo: Rod Henmi).
a shapeless dust cloud invades the conti-
nents. Your atlas preserves the differences in-
tact: that assortment of qualities ivhich are
like letters in a name.
"^
In his book Invisible Cities. Italo Calvino
describes a conversation between Marco Polo
and the great Emperor Kublai Khan. This
exchange reveals the fears ofa powerful man,
as he attempts to experience his empire
through the accounts of the traveler Polo.
While afraid that his empire is slipping away
from him, he is still confident that nothing
will undermine his power to know it through
the irrational taxonomy of his atlas. To the
great emperor, this atlas represents an
analogical empire. It allows him to visit cities
he could never see (Jerusalem, Atlantis, New
York), to hold the history ofhuman culture in
his hands. In the space formed by the pages
of this atlas there is a "place" that emerges
from the tension between distant locations,
the relationships that hold them together, the
distinctions that keep them apart.
In the work of Aalto, the site is like the atlas
of Khan. It is a surface which is already
"written" upon, and on which his projects
engage in a subtle dialogue like characters in
the pages of a book, "Place" emerges as the
quality of relationships between these char-
acters, as the site holds together and grounds
them. Thus, his projects are a topology on
which the complex layering of intentions are
held in balance. In the Town Hall at
Saynatsalo this sense is expressed through
its presence on the site as a horizontal block
placed into the low-relief terrain. This idea is
reinforced through the nature and placement
of the flanking housing blocks, which both
measure the slope and define the slowly
rising diagonal path to the town hall. This
reading of topological "grounding" is rein-
forced through the material expression of the
building as a homogeneous brick mass that
is carved into and built upon. In this sense,
this building becomes the hill, a conception
that is reinforced by the creation of a new
ground through the raised courtyard that is
set within the hollowed-out mass.
However, this topological reading begins to
fluctuate when the project is more closely
examined. As one approaches the building,
the sense of solid mass is brought into ques-
tion by the transparency of the base, as is
particularly evident in the council chambers
tower. The impression of the solid exterior
form is also undermined by the two entrances
which carve into the comers of the block and
cause the enclosed space to dissipate. These
kinds offormal ambiguities are further elabo-
rated when this project is examined from the
viewpoint of typology. At a general level the
reference between Saynatsalo and tradi-
tional town hall configurations is fairly self-
evident, as observed by Demitri Porphyries in
his article 'The Retrieval of Memory."** The
references to typology are clearly present in
the plan through the elements of the solid
exterior wall, the circulation which follows
the profile of the court, and the tower which
marks the civic presence of the building.
However, further examination reveals a kind
ofdiagonal direction to the plan, which pivots
from the mass of the council chambers, and
separates itself from the residential section
and the library block. These two pieces are
held together by massing, and yet are syntac-
tically indifferent to the rest of the building.
as evidenced by their internal structuring of
space. These kinds of particularities suggest
that within the project there is an interaction
between the typological and topological refer-
ences which hold it together and the differ-
ences which begin to separate it into distinct
pieces.
An understanding of this tenuous balancing
in Aalto's work begins to reveal the concep-
tion of space which appears to be not a priori
but a result of the relationships between
elements. This observation has been made
by Goran Schildt, who compares the idea of
space in Aalto with the paintings of Cezanne.'^
For Cezanne the canvas forms a two-dimen-
sional surface on which objects are depicted
and out ofwhich a "spatial" reading emerges.
In Saynatsalo the "space" grows out of the
topology of surface, which is given clear
expression in the sensuous materiality of the
courtyard space. The treatment of the
ground plane indicates that this void is read,
not only through its boundaries, but also
through the expression of surfaces. Squares
of paving material, small trees, and a reflect-
ing pool interact within the courtyard to such
an extent that the space is "read" through
them. At the same time these elements seem
to form a relationship to the walls around
them and thus engage these walls with this
manipulated horizontal plane. The sense of
interaction of surface is further developed in
the mass and materiality of the walls. The
library presents a neutral brick facade which
defers to the domestically scaled wood-and-
stucco facade of the town hall corridor. Yet
simultaneously the solid wall of the library
projects into the space, allowing its entrance
to be clear, and engaging the courtyard in the
same way that the council chamber tower
does. Through this reading of the horizontal
surfaces and surrounding walls, the "space"
of the courtyard emerges. It is a "space"
which, while topologically and typologically
grounded, expresses its specific differences
at a syntactic and material level. Out of this
complex web of relationships emerges the
salient qualities of "place," a place which
grows out of the resonances between objects
set within the terrain of the site.
place(s) of memory
"The art ofmemory is an invisible art. it reflects
real places but is about, not the places them-
selves, but the reflection of these within the
imagination."^''
In her article, 'The Art of Memory." Frances
Yates talks about the history of mnemonics,
a history which began with the practices of
the Roman orators. She describes the
memory training of these great men as an
artificial memory which consists of places
and images. This "system" of memory is
based upon the ability of the speaker to
wander through "spaces" in his or her mind,
spaces on which images are "placed," images
which induce memory. This idea was given
specific form in the memory theatre of Guido
Camillo. a series of seven spaces that were
characterized by religious and iconic images.
This theater was more than a neutral "space"
in the mind of the speaker, it was a physical
setting which, through these images, "con-
tained" and "induced" memory. The Casa del
Fascio is this kind of memory machine. Its
formal, material, and iconic expressions are
a result of the "messages" that are com-
pressed into it, and overlaid on its surfaces.
These references creates a "montage" of the
past and the present, which interact to create
a "place" that resides in the mind.
In the Casa del Fascio, this "place" ofmemory
emerges from the overlapping readings of the
physical and material forms of the building in
which the past and the present "speak." This
conversation is initiated by the mass of the
building, a proportioned marble block set in
relation to the "lacustrine beauty of Como""
and the physical presence of the adjacent
Duomo. This conception of mass is also
evident in the domestic type of the palazzo,
appropriated here by Terragni as the form for
a new institution for the Fascist Regime. The
use of wall architecture is also deeply rooted
in Roman building tradition, where weight
and mass are innately present. However, in
this building the sense of mass is given
definition through the marble cladding which
begins to suggest that "the empty space is the
air and the solid is transparent."'^ This sense
jsas;a
Figure 2. Giuseppe Terragni. Casa del Fascio, Como. 1936. view offront facade (photo: Bolond Bognarj.
ofthe transparency ofthe solid is also evident
in the use of the concrete frame, a form which
is simultaneously Roman and modem. The
frame engages in a dialogue with the wall,
each facade balancing this interaction in a
different way. Out of this relationship be-
tween wall and frame grows a sophisticated
dialogue in which references are suggested,
deferred, and redefined.
These formal and historical echoes are most
specifically present in the front facade, which
contains and compresses this interaction
into its surfaces. The conceptual resonances
between past references and present icons
are at a point of being frozen here. The frame
and the wall exist in the same plane, but
neither is given clear dominance. Is this a
frame which has been filled in to suggest a
tower, or a wall that has been carved out to
make a frame? There is only silence, as each
element never achieves a point of rest. The
facade alternates between being read as solid
mass and as transparency, wherein these
elements begin to change their positions.
One can read the transparency of the solid
wall, more clearly present in the interior
"room" ofthe building. One can also perceive
the solidity of the "wall" of space compressed
between the facade and the exterior wall, a
space which also suggests the transparency
of the interior.
These observations bear witness to the writ-
ings of Terragni, which speak of the reso-
nances between the past and the present,
where "tradition does not disappear, but
changes appearance."'^ This relationship of
past and present is suggestive of the histori-
cal materialism of Walter Benjamin, "a past,
charged with the time of the now which is
blasted out of the continuum of history."'^
The decoration of the front facade, proposed
by Terragni, is exemplary of this kind of
relationship, as through the use of photo-
montages he was able to freeze the past and
the present through iconic and symbolic
"messages." During this period photomon-
tage was employed extensively as a political
device, as it was able to compress a specific
moment and deliver all of the impact of that
intense moment instantaneously. On this
facade these photomontages would have il-
lustrated certain significant moments in the
history of fascism, as well as specific social
themes such as agriculture and the family.
These images were to play on the surface of
the facade, as perspectival images which are
cropped and recombined like illustrations in
a magazine. In this sense this facade is like
the topology of Aalto: it is a ground on which
these images engage in a dialogue, a dialogue
which sets into motion a chain of associa-
tions in the mind of the observer. Through
the unique abilities of photomontage to cap-
ture a moment and compress it into a power-
ful message, this facade is a memory ma-
chine. It is a "montage" of political and
cultural messages which opens up a territory
in which the past and the present are frozen,
in which memory is the "place" where archi-
tecture exists.
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How Quickly Does Fast Change?
Alan Stacell
Texas A & M
Shivers, bones, scantlings, trusses and studs, and
how many times must you look before you see?
And how many looks do you get? What if you use
up all of your looks before the object that you are
looking at is exhausted of its supply of images?
What if you use all the images? Does it vanish?
structure is a patterned behavior of whole systems of
forces. The behavior of any pari or component of a
system constitutes a separate whole system. The terms
separate parts and subassembly become oxymorons.
'^f^
^•^-
Imagine thinking of structure as a chain of endlessly
renewing omnidirectional empirical events in which
one broken link would be only a momentary blip.
while the matrix restructures itself.
The terms "form, " "structure, "and "shape" are some-
times substituted onefor the other. I would submit
that for my purpose "form" is intended to allude to
a whole configuration or entity that has bounda-
ries: "structure" is the pattern ofgenerativeforces,
whether empirical or mental: and "shape" is a two-
dimensional silhouette or profile.
Tech Heads and Paper Tigers:
Theory vs. Technology in Architectural Research
Charles F. Morgan
University of Florida
"Tech Heads and Paper Tigers: Theory vs.
Technology in Architectural Research" was
originally presented at the Architectural Re-
search Centers Consortium national confer-
ence (School ofArchitecture. UIUC). 1988.
Introduction
Most ofus recognize the problem: it has been
with us a very long time. We see the separa-
tion of faculties into camps, the unequal
funding of research and/or salaries, even the
division of students along the lines of the
factions. The problem, of course, is the
perceived dichotomy between technological
and formal issues in architectural research
and education.
The bases for the problem may be equally
obvious: long-standing individual interests
in art and inductive methods rather than
science and deductive methods: a cultural or
inherited bias toward right-brain thinking
rather than left-brain thinking: a tendency
toward either the practical or the sublime;
even a disposition to address issues ofgreater
or lesser economic import.
The symptoms of this theory/art vs. prac-
tice/technology dichotomy present them-
selves repeatedly: Within some schools of
architecture, professors in technological
topic areas are treated as second-class citi-
zens, only peripherally involved in curricu-
lum development, rewarded only minimally
at salary time, and generally disregarded as
"necessary evils" in the architectural educa-
tion/research process. Of course, at other
schools, the bias toward "practical" educa-
tion holds sway, and the technologists have
the upper hand.
In the research realm, however, it is more
clear, at least to me, that one group has
precedence over the other. The funding
available for research in the technological
aspects of architecture is both more abun-
dant and more readily available. Especially
over the last few years, technically oriented
individuals within architecture programs
have been increasingly able to provide evi-
dence of their worthiness to produce useful
research. Funding for less technical re-
search, especially that in architectural the-
ory, is both less abundant and not readily
available to researchers from architecture
schools. This reflects not only the current
administration's attitude toward the "utility"
of such research, but perhaps also a general
attitude by funding agencies toward esoteric
research being done within what they con-
sider to be an engineering-oriented disci-
pline.
Interestingly, we seem to prompt this behav-
ior in others by our own actions. The recent
Research Conference conducted by the
Architectural Research Centers Consortium
had not a single session devoted to non-
technological issues. The stated objective of
this conference was to discuss research
agendas in architecture, yet it omitted that
area that lies closest to the hearts of most
architects and building designers: architec-
tural form and theory. Moreover, the rela-
tionship of formal theory to technological
theory was also omitted. 1 take issue with
such an omission, even though my main
interests lie in the technological aspects of
architecture.
A BriefHistory ofTechnology
To be sure, this attitude expressing a dichot-
omy between formal theory and technology
has not always existed. The origins of the
discussion begin with Greek philosophers,
who express in the words techne and logos
that technology is something far beyond the
study of machines and/or processes.
Rather, technology at that time implied,
according to Heidegger, a "bringing forth,"
[poiesis] ofnot only the "activities and skills of
the craftsman" but also the "arts of the mind
and the fine arts." Indeed, according to
Heidegger, techne "is something poetic."'
Coupling logos, the discourse or thinking
about something, with techne, technology
implies discourse and/or thought about the
techniques of artisans, as well as the arts of
the mind, and issues that are poetic as well as
scientific.
This, of course, is contrary to the more popu-
lar image of technology, that it is related to
the study and/or use of machines, or that it
exclusively addresses technical processes.
This point of view originated in the thinking
of sixteenth-century rationalist philoso-
phers. From that time onward, according to
one current theorist. Marc Angelil, "human
thought and action," including design, "be-
came increasingly dominated by rational
constructs" and the scientific method.^
Moreover, the design professions adopted
this view so completely that a split occurred
between engineers, who were primarily inter-
ested in rational, scientific methodological
approaches to design, and artists, especially
"fine" artists, who were primarily interested
in poetic, mythical, and imaginative ap-
proaches to design. Put another way, ration-
alism resulted in the current popular thought
that technology should be coupled with art in
a dichotomy. This popular dichotomy uses a
variety of phrases, including, but not limited
to: Art vs. science, theory vs. practice, artists
vs. technicians, right-brain thinking vs, left-
brain thinking, or even natural vs. unnatu-
ral, to be a bit provocative.
Peter McCleary makes a similar argumeft
when he explains that, while scientia implies
the "theory" of any discipline, the natural
sciences developed such rigor in their meth-
odology that they "annexed" the word "sci-
ence," Applied sciences (engineering disci-
plines), the principal originators of theories
about building, subsequently adopted "tech-
nology" as their operative term. "In this case
(engineering), we have, not the 'logos' (think-
ing/discourse) of the 'techne,' but the 'scien-
tia' ofthe 'techne.' Thus technology is read as
a derivative of engineering or applied sci-
ences. . . . Our professions too readily ac-
cepted the sixteenth-century separation of
the artist and the artisan, and embraced the
notion that 'art' is a creative act, which is
totally subjective and one whose product is to
be praised for its lack of utility."^
Current Attitudes
The implications of this current attitude
toward technology and its relationship to art
and formal theory may be costly. At the very
least, our disposition toward architecture
may be severely stilted, as the following argu-
ment may suggest:
The question comes to mind: What do we
expect of architecture? Most simplistically,
we hope it will provide us with shelter, protect
us adequately from the elements, and do so
with some measure of structural safety. If
that is all we ask, then architecture is tech-
nology, even assuming the popular definition
of technology, for basic shelter with atten-
dant structural safety is more a technical
matter than an aesthetic one.
But architecture is more than the making of
buildings. Heidegger poses a relationship
between dwelling (the verb) and building (the
verb). To live on earth, as a mortal, is to dwell,
according to Heidegger.^ But without protec-
tion, man cannot live on earth, he cannot
dwell. So then, building is necessary if man
is to dwell on earth. "We do not dwell because
we have built, but rather we build because we
must dwell. "^
However, according to Ortega y Gasset,
"pleasurable states ofmind" are as necessary
to man as food and shelter. "Not being, but
well-being, is the fundamental necessity of
man, the necessity of necessities ""^ This
might imply that the popular attitude toward
technology—that it is concerned more about
"bare" necessities like protection from the
elements—is well placed in its dichotomous
relationship to aesthetics and formal theory.
However, James Marston Fitch argues: "It
goes without saying that all architects aspire
to the creation of beautiful buildings. But a
fundamental weakness in most discussions
of architectural aesthetics is a failure to re-
late it to its matrix of experiential reality."'' He
further argues that separating aesthetics,
the "well-being" of buildings, from experi-
ence, the "dwelling" in buildings, is not rea-
sonable or logical. We cannotjudge architec-
ture accurately without associating aesthetic
questions about a building with their experi-
ential counterparts.
Relating these to the question concerning our
expectations of architecture, one must ob-
serve that architects do not themselves build
their designs. While technical issues are
critical to their design, architects are not
concerned with the execution of those tech-
niques. Technique, of course, is related to
technology, but it addresses more the man-
ner or methods by which an individual ap-
plies the skills of his profession or art. In any
case, architecture is more the discourse or
theory of making/designing buildings than
about the building itself. Going back to
techne and logos, then, architecture is tech-
nology. To suggest otherwise would be to bias
the discussion and misrepresent architec-
ture and its dual aesthetic and technical
nature.
However, it is in another matter that a mis-
reading of the relationship between art/aes-
thetics and technology can be most costly:
competitiveness. If architects do not under-
stand or do not attend to the coequal status
of art and technology, then it is more difficult
to transfer new technological information to
designers or, conversely, for designers to
communicate their need for innovative tech-
nology to experts in other fields. Cultures
and/or nations that encourage such transfer
obviously will gain advantages in the archi-
tectural and building-construction markets.
In a more subtle way, such exclusiveness by
either designers or technologists can also be
harmful in a competitive sense. Poetry,
imagination, fantasy, magic, and myth are
not the enemies oftechnologists or aesthetes.
Rather, they provide an "idea pool" from
which new knowledge may be gathered, and
to which rational processes can be attached.
Coupling such non-technical ideas with ra-
tionalism will expand its utility, not damage
it. Very possibly, a wider variety of technical
or aesthetic problems can be solved, some of
which may even be constrained by solely
rational processes. Jacques Ellul stated the
constraints rather well:
"Modem science failed to maintain its bonds
to the origins of imaginative thought. ... it
became purely conceptual. Similar was the
development of technology: the emphasis on
rationality in scientific thought became the
primary characteristic for technical under-
standing. Rationality, best exemplified in
systematization, division of labor, creation of
standards, and production norms, led to the
reduction of method to its logical dimension
alone, excluding spontaneity, creativity, and
imagination. Every intervention of technique
became in effect a reduction of facts and prin-
ciples to the schema of logic. Technological
order in the modem era, following the prem-
ises set by the Cartesian model of mind, was
functionalized, reduced to efficient proce-
dures, and totally devoid of poetic meaning.""
Even at a smaller scale, within our own
subculture of architectural researchers and
educators, the dichotomy of art and technol-
ogy does harm. Too much architectural
research funding is awarded to non-archi-
tectural research organizations, in part be-
cause we do not even support each other's
research credibility. As was mentioned pre-
viously, such an impression was conveyed at
the Architectural Research Centers
Consortium's recent Research Conference.
At the very least, each group loses credibility
with at least half of its potential research
sponsors. There Is an incompleteness in our
current attitude toward architecture, art,
and technology: "Architects who have aimed
at acquiring manual skill (art) without schol-
arship (science/technology) have never been
able to reach a position of authority to corre-
spond to their pains, while those who relied
only upon theories and scholarship were
obviously hunting the shadow, not the sub-
stance. But those who have a thorough
knowledge of both, like men armed at all
points, have the sooner attained their object
and carried authority with them. ^
A New Attitude
Heidegger builds a very strong link between
techne (activities and skills ofthe artisan, and
the arts of the mind and the fine arts) and
poiesis (bring forth). But poiesis in its highest
form results in physis. the "arising of some-
thing from out of itself," and, in turn, ale-
theia, truth resulting from the revealing or
bringing forth [poiesis) of those things that
had previously been concealed. So technol-
ogy is a way of revealing and knowing, in the
widest sense: technology is a way of revealing
truth. Put another way, technology is the
theoretical framework within which knowl-
edge is acquired and understood.'" Insofar
as we wish to understand architecture, we
must also understand technology.
Solutions to such a longstanding problem, of
course, are difficult, especially since, in my
view, the wall between artists and technolo-
gists has been built, in recent years, from
both sides. For individuals in one or the other
of these arenas, perhaps increased cogni-
zance of the problem and its potential for
damage will be helpful in reaching the solu-
tion, at least by small steps. Larger steps can
be taken by organizations like the Architec-
tural Research Centers Consortium, through
the sponsorship of research projects, confer-
ences, and papers that more equally address
topics ofboth artistic and technological inter-
est. In the long run, "technology must read-
dress the imaginative content of creative pro-
duction."" In practice, research, and educa-
tion, we should be equally concerned with
"well-being," a plane of existence far above
simple "dwelling," and possible only through
the thorough integration of art, technology,
and architecture.
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